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Liability Crisis on Canadian Corporate Governance
Abstract
One of the clearest legacies of the growing concern expressed over the international competitiveness of
Canadian and American businesses has been the urgency it has lent to a very old debate respecting the efficacy
of the apparatus used to govern the business and affairs of large, public corporations. For instance, Michael
Porter, one of the most articulate - if not the most prolific - of the new competitiveness scholars, has suggested
that American economic performance could be improved by enhancing the performance of the traditional
corporate governance apparatus. In this respect, his suggestions closely track the thrust of recent reform
initiatives proposed by investors and regulators who seek to increase the performance of the board by making
it more responsive, indeed responsible, to shareholder interests. Although some of the current critics of the
corporate board have placed exclusive faith in the ability of market mechanisms to ensure heightened board
effectiveness, most initiatives rely to some extent on strengthened legal duties and responsibilities to achieve
this task. And, as measured by the growing willingness of both courts and securities regulators to impose
liability on directors for failing to review diligently various corporate transactions (i.e., self-interested
transactions, public financings, etc.), it is clear that the reformist calls made by these critics are slowly but
surely being heeded. Paralleling the trend to increased legal liability of boards for actions that are inimical to
shareholder interests has been an equally clear trend towards enhanced legal responsibility for corporate
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the clearest legacies of the growing concern expressed
over the international competitiveness of Canadian and American
businesses has been the urgency it has lent to a very old debate
respecting the efficacy of the apparatus used to govern the
business and affairs of large, public corporations.! For instance,
Michael Porter, one of the most articulate - if not the most
prolific - of the new competitiveness scholars, has suggested that
American economic performance could be improved by
enhancing the performance of the traditional corporate gover-
nance apparatus. 2 In this respect, his suggestions closely track the
thrust of recent reform initiatives proposed by investors and
regulators who seek to increase the performance of the board by
making it more responsive, indeed responsible, to shareholder
interests.3 Although some of the current critics of the corporate
board have placed exclusive faith in the ability of market mecha-
nisms to ensure heightened board effectiveness, most initiatives
rely to some extent on strengthened legal duties and responsibil-
ities to achieve this task. And, as measured by the growing
willingness of both courts and securities regulators to impose
liability on directors for failing to review diligently various
corporate transactions (i.e., self-interested transactions, public
financings, etc.), it is clear that the reformist calls made by these
critics are slowly but surely being heeded.4 Paralleling the trend to
1 The intellectual antecedents of the current debate can be found in A. Berle and G.
Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Harcourt, Brace & World rev.
ed., 1968).
2 M. Porter, The Competitive AdvantageofNations (New York, The Free Press, 1990), pp.
110-13. Mature American corporations are less capable of sustaining a commitment to
certain espoused goals because of infirmities in the governance process that lead to "har-
vesting of competitive positions and an inadequate level of investment to sustain
improvement and innovation" (ibid., at p. 112).
3 Chancellor William Allen, Delaware Court of Chancery, "Redefining the Role of
Outside Directors In an Age of Global Competition", presented at Ray Garrett J r. ,
Corporate and Securities Law Institute, Northwestern University, Chicago (April, 1992).
See, for instance, M. Lipton and J. Lorsch, "A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance" (1992) 48 Business Lawyer 59.
4 A recent example of the expansive range of legal duties being imposed on Canadian
boards is the Ontario Securities Commission's revised Policy 9.1, Disclosure, Valuation,
Review and Approval Requirements and Recommendations for Insider Bids, Issuer Bids,
Going Private Transactions and Related Party Transactions. The Policy stipulates a set of
procedures (e.g., valuation requirements, speCial committee review and minority share-
holder approvals) that must be followed by corporate boards in order to sanitize conflict
of interest transactions such as insider bids, issuer bids, going private transactions and
related party transactions.
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increased legal liability of boards for actions that are inimical to
shareholder interests has been an equally clear trend towards
enhanced legal responsibility for corporate conduct deemed
contrary to broader stakeholder or community interests.5
Nevertheless, as must be plainly obvious, invoking the board as
an instrument of public policy is not uncontroversial, and raises
perplexing moral questions regarding the appropriate deference
to be accorded to notions of fault and personal responsibility in
policy formulation. 6 However, controversy over the appropriate
scope of board responsibility extends also to the economic realm,
particularly in terms of the commensurability of the costs and
benefits of enhanced directorial liability. Central to the determi-
nation of this issue is the subsidiary issue of whether insurance is
available to directors and officers to cover (even on a co-insurance
basis) the risks of increases in expected liability. This issue is of
fundamental importance given the natural disinclination of
directors, both managerial and outside, to assume firm-specific
risks. 7 That is, if for some reason insurance markets are not
complete and, as a consequence, directors are unable to source
insurance, then, following the dictates of agency theory, boards
can be expected to refrain from engaging in activities which -
although justified on an ex ante economic calculus - are deemed
to be too costly because they raise the spectre of personal
bankruptcy for directors. Alternatively, directors may agree to
assume these risks so long as they can shift them to some outside
parties, usually professional advisers. In either case, insurance
5 See discussion in Part IV 2.(2), infra.
6 See, for instance, R. Epstein, A Theory ofStrict Liability: Toward a Reformulation ofTort
Law (San Francisco, Cato Institute, 1980). For a discussion of the limits of Epstein's
theory, see J. Coleman, "Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits: Part 1", and
chapter 2 in M. Bayles and B. Chapman, Justice, Rights and Tort Law (Dordrecht,
Holland, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1983).
7 M. Jensen and W. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure" (1976), 3 J. Financial Economics 305 ("managers of large,
publicly held corporations seem to behave in a risk averse way to the detriment of the
equity holders" (ibid., at p. 353». See also B. Holmstrom, "Moral Hazard and Observa-
bility" (1979), 10 Bell J. Economics 74; Y. Amihud and B. Lev, "Risk Reduction as a
Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers" (1981), 12 Bell J. Economics 605
("mergers ... viewed as a managerial perquisite intended to decrease the risk associated
with managerial human capital. Accordingly, the consequences of such mergers may be
regarded as an agency cost" (ibid., at p. 606»; and A. Marcus, "Risk Sharing and the
Theory ofthe Firm" (1982), 13 Bell J. Economics 369 ("constrained managers overspend
on variance reducing activities, thereby imposing a welfare loss on the other owners, and
by this definition, exhibit excessive risk aversion" (ibid., at p. 375».
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availability impacts powerfully on corporate performance: in the
risk-avoidance case, by reducing the riskiness (thus profitability)
of the firm's investment set and, in the risk-shifting case, by
reducing the stake of directors in corporate decision making
through artful delegation.
In this article we explore the dynamics of the Canadian
directors' and officers' insurance market by focusing on the crisis
that afflicted that market in the mid-1980s (the "D&O crisis").
The crisis involved a dramatic and unanticipated contraction in the
availability of D&O insurance. By understanding the roots of that
crisis, one can make some informed predictions respecting the
availability and pricing of directors' and officers' insurance in
Canada. Our conclusions are somewhat troubling for enthusiasts
of enhanced legal liabilities for directors. Close examination of the
D&O crisis reveals that the market is vulnerable to cyclical
industry-wide fluctuations in capacity and pricing that greatly
undermine the ability of directors to insure against the future costs
of legal liability. These problems are exacerbated by market
conventions which limit the effective duration of coverage (short
policy and post-policy discovery periods).
Although a number ofdifferent independent theories have been
proffered to explain the occurrence of the mid-1980s crisis in
liability insurance, following Romano's study of the American
D&O crisis, we prefer a multi-factorial explanation that draws on
an amalgam of endogenous (industry) and exogenous (legal and
market) components.8 This approach is congenial to the determi-
nation of the extent to which linkages between the American and
Canadian economies affected the Canadian crisis. While we find
evidence that American trends are being used to inform risk
prediction in the Canadian D&O market, we argue that this is not
evidence of undue market power possessed by American insurers
(essentially a story positing cross subsidies from Canadian to
American consumers), but is simply the result of statistical imper-
atives which limit the predictive significance of the Canadian loss
experience.
Our argument is developed in several stages. In Part II, we
8 R. Romano, "Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: What Went Wrong?" in W.
Olson, ed., New Directions in Liability Law (New York, The Academy of Political
Science, 1988). See also Romano, "What Went Wrong With Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance?" (1989), 14 Delaware J. Corp. L. 1; and "Corporate Governance in
the Aftermathofthe Insurance Crisis" (1990), 39 Emory L. J. 1155.
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outline the nature of D&O liability insurance - the risks it is
meant to insure and the operations of the different levels of the
insurance market. Part III establishes the features which charac-
terized the 1985-86 crisis in the D&O liability market in Canada.
Part IV examines the causes posited to explain the United States
D&O crisis, but in the context of their applicability to the
Canadian market. Part V uses the conclusions drawn as to the
causes of the D&O crisis to evaluate recent regulatory initiatives
of the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institu-
tions and to consider the implications of incomplete insurance
markets on the quality of Canadian corporate governance.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR AND STRUCTURE OF D&O LIABILITY
INSURANCE
By and large, most liberal scholars are willing to support
government intervention designed to internalize the non-nego-
tiated external costs of a given activity pursuant to Kaldor-Hicks
notions of efficiency.9 Typically, this intervention takes the form
of either property rights or liability rules that attempt to recon-
struct the allocation of resources that fully informed parties would
conclude through their transaction-costs-free bargaining. 1O
However, when the party generating external costs is a corpo-
ration, special problems are posed for courts and legislatures in
determining the extent to which individual parties within the
corporation should be held legally responsible for this activity, and
the way in which this responsibility should interact with enterprise
liability. 11
9 See J. Coleman, Markets, Morals and the Law (Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University
Press, 1988) and M. Trebilcock, The Limits of Freedom ofContract (Cambridge, Mass.,
Harv. University Press, 1993), chapters 1 and 3.
10 G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral" (1972), 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089.
11 An extremely thoughtful exposition of the interaction between gatekeeper and enter-
prise liability can be found in R. Kraakman, "Corporate Liability Strategies and the
Costs of Legal Controls" (1984),93 Yale L.J. 857; and "Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy" (1986), 2J. Law, Economics and Org. 53. See also J.
Coffee, " 'No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick': An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1981),79 Mich. L.Rev. 386; and P. Halpern, M.
Trebilcock and S. Turnbul1, "An Economic Analysis ofLimited Liability in Corporation
Law" (1980), 30 U.T.L.J. 117. For a recent discussion in the Canadian context see: R.J.
Daniels, "Must Boards go Overboard: An Economic Analysis of Burgeoning Statutory
Liability on the Role of Directors in Corporate Governance", draft article dated June 20,
1993, on file with the authors.
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The issue of the appropriate scope for enterprise and personal
liability is heightened in the case of directors12 who may not have
been directly responsible for ordering the corporation to engage in
certain socially undesirable types of activity, but are nevertheless
held legally responsible for the consequences of this activity by
virtue of their corporate status. This liability is commonly referred
to as "gatekeeper liability", and is found in the various common
law and statutory duties that officers and directors owe to share-
holders, employees, creditors, suppliers and communities. The
rationale for gatekeeper liability is based on the belief that the
existing array of traditional sanctions and rewards pinpointing
liability on the enterprise and on the actual wrongdoer within the
enterprise are incapable of reducing the level of corporate wrong-
doing to socially optimal levels. It is therefore necessary to enlist
the services of third-party monitors, albeit under the threat of
personal liability, to score further reductions in corporate
wrongdoing. 13
Like other forms of civil liability, gatekeeper liability for
corporate delicts will affect both the care and activity levels of
targeted individuals. This is both the intended and obvious effect
of deterrence-based liability rules. However, there is a danger that
the rules imposing this liability will be given overly zealous inter-
pretation by the courts, resulting in excessive levels of deterrence.
This is of particular concern in the corporate case given
managerial risk aversion14 and the prospect that the application of
gatekeeper liability will be governed by compensatory rather than
deterrence objectives.15
To temper excessive care and activity level reactions to
potential gatekeeper liability, modern corporate law statutes
permit a corporation to indemnify a director for any expense
reasonably incurred in defending, settling or satisfying a judgment
for any action, provided that the director's fiduciary duty to act
"honestly and in good faith and with a view to the best interests of
the corporation" has been fulfilled. 16 For indemnity with respect
12 For convenience, the term "directors" will be used throughout this paper in place of the
more cumbersome, but correct, term "directors and officers" when referring to the
objects of the liability which D&O insurance covers.
13 See Kraakman (1986), supra, footnote 11, at pp. 55-7.
14 See supra, footnote 7.
15 For a discussion of the tension between deterrence and compensation objectives in the
tort context, see M. Trebilcock, "The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modem
North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis"
(1987),24 San Diego L.Rev. 929.
16 Canada Business Corporations Act ("CBCA"), R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 124(I)(a).
Ontario Business Corporations Act ("OBCA"), R.S.O. 1990, c. B. 16, s. 136(1)(a).
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to criminal or administrative actions enforceable by fines, there
must also have been reasonable grounds for believing that the
conduct was lawfulY This option to indemnify becomes an
obligation if the director is substantially successful on the merits of
the defence to any action, again so long as he or she acted honestly
and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corpo-
ration; and had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her
conduct was lawful. 18 The quality of corporate governance is
upheld by this obligation since winning on a technicality, such as
the expiration of a limitation period barring the action in question,
does not give rise to a mandatory duty for the corporation to
indemnify the successful director.
Modern corporations statutes also permit a corporation to
purchase insurance for the benefit of a director against any liability
which may be incurred in his or her capacity as a director,
provided always that such liability does not result from a failure to
act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of
the corporation. 19 Corporations can, therefore, purchase
insurance for directors with coverage for a wider range of
behaviour than that for which direct corporate indemnification is
allowed. Actions which are insurable but not indemnifiable
include those for which objectively reasonable grounds did not
exist, but in respect of which the director none the less acted
honestly and in good faith; an example would be a successful
shareholders' derivative action for negligence where the court
refuses to permit indemnification.20
Due to the different coverages of indemnification and D&O
insurance, corporations typically purchase two types of D&O
liability insurance coverage: Corporate Reimbursement
Coverage, to cover losses to the corporation arising from the
corporation's indemnification of a director, and Personal
Coverage to cover the liability of a director for which he or she is
not indemnified by the corporation and would otherwise be
personally responsible. 21 In addition to coverage for legalliabil-
17 CBCA, s. 124(1)(b); OBCA, s. 136(1)(b).
18 CBCA, s. 124(3); OBCA, s. 136(3).
19 CBCA, s. 124(4); OBCA, s. 136(4).
20 When the corporation itself is the plaintiff, indemnification is subject to the approval of
the court: CBCA, s. 124(2); OBCA, s. 136(2).
21 Although both Corporate and Personal coverage are normally purchased at once, they
are often written as separate policies.
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ities not permitted at law to be covered through corporate indem-
nification, Personal Coverage assures directors that they will not
be forced to bear costs for which the corporation may lawfully
indemnify them, but owing to financial hardship (e.g., insolvency)
cannot. Such coverage will also protect the officer and director
against the failure of the corporation to remit withheld taxes to
Revenue Canada22 or to pay employee wages that are due. 23
The supply side of the 0&0 insurance market is two-tiered,
with "primary" insurers writing the policies and then reselling the
coverage in excess of a certain designated loss liability (the so-
called "excess" layer) to what are known as "reinsurers". The
reinsurers are liable for a particular claim only after the original
insurer has paid a designated amount - this retained amount is
known as the "primary" layer. The reinsurers receive a portion of
the premium commensurate to their portion of the risk, but also
pay what is known as a "ceding" commission to the insurer that
brings them the business. The capacity of the reinsurance market
to underwrite risks has a profound effect upon the capacity of the
primary insurers, particularly for such large and specialized risks
as 0&0 policies, since it is through reinsurance that insurers
themselves spread their risks and limit their potential liability.
III. CRISIS IN THE 0&0 INSURANCE MARKET
The market for 0&0 insurance began to develop in North
America in the 1930s with the passage of securities legislation in
the United States which provided for personal liability of directors
in certain circumstances. 0&0 liability insurance was introduced
to Canada in the early 1960s, but it was not until the mid-1970s that
0&0 coverage became widespread. At that time, an expansion in
the supply capacity of the international reinsurance market and a
concomitant reduction in the price of reinsurance led to an influx
of participants to the 0&0 field in both Canada and the United
States. At the same time, more stringent enforcement of the
securities laws and a greater propensity for litigation, particularly
in the United States, saw more companies buying 0&0 liability
insurance in order to attract and retain high quality directors and
senior corporate officers.
22 Canadian Income Tax Act ("ITA"), R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as amended, s. 227.1.
23 CBCA, s. 119(1); OBCA, s. 131(1).
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The latter half of the 1970s and the early 1980s saw a gradual
increase in the amount of effective insurance coverage as
measured by a reduction in premiums and deductibles for D&O
coverage in both countries, as well as an increase in the magnitude
and scope of insurance policies.24 Although Canadian corpora-
tions have been historically less likely than their U.S. counterparts
to purchase D&O insurance ,25 and although both policy limits and
premiums have historically been much smaller than those
prevailing south of the border, the same pattern of gradual
expansion of product in the insurance industry prevailed.26
The mid-1980s witnessed a sudden change in the markets for
general liability insurance and for D&O insurance in Canada and
the United States, referred to colloquially as the Insurance Crisis.
The Insurance Crisis was denoted by increased premiums, lower
coverage limits, increased exclusion of some previously insurable
risks, a movement toward claims-based from occurrence-based
policies, and higher industry profits.27 The Tort Policy Working
Group of the U. S. Department of Justice reported that municipal-
ities faced a doubling or tripling of premiums, often accompanied
by lower policy limits and higher deductibles. 28 Forty percent of
U.S. daycare centres' insurance policies were simply cancelled, as
insurers refused to insure them at any price. Sudden and
accidental pollution coverage was excluded from all general
liability insurance policies. Similar difficulties in obtaining
24 The Wyau 1987 Directors' and Officers' and Fiduciary Liability Survey (the "1987 Wyatt
Survey"), the Wyatt Co. (Chicago, 1987).
25 In 1978,93% of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange had coverage,
while only 43% of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange had purchased
D&O insurance. By 1987, 96.8% of the NYSEcompanies surveyed had purchased D&O
coverage, and 87.7% of the TSE respondents were covered. In both countries,
companies with assets of $100 million or more, hospitals and educational institutions
were most likely to have D&O coverage (1987 Wyatt Survey, supra, footnote 24, at p.
50). Since a majority of claims under D&O policies are brought by shareholders (65% of
claims in Canada in 1989 and 50% in the U.S.: 1989 Wyau Canadian Directors' and
Officers' Liability Survey (the "1989 Wyatt Canadian Survey"), the Wyatt Co. (Toronto,
1989», and public corporations tend to be larger than private corporations, the corre-
lation between asset size and D&O coverage is not surprising.
26 For a detailed comparison of the claims and premium histories ofthe Canadian and U.S.
D&O markets, see the 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra, footnote 24.
T1 Ralph A. Winter, "The Liability Crisis and the Dynamics of Competitive Insurance
Markets" (1988), 5 YaleJ. on Regulation 455.
28 U.S. Department of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes,
Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and
Affordability (February, 1986), chapter 1, as cited in Trebilcock, supra, footnote 15, at p.
933.
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affordable coverage were reported by businesses in almost every
conceivable activity - from publishers and engineers, to dentists
and toy manufacturers.
As Trebilcock notes, there was evidence of a similar but more
subdued crisis in liability insurance in Canada.29 The Ontario Task
Force on Insurance (the Slater Task Force) reported that nearly
half of the members of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association
experienced a doubling of liability insurance premiums and a
reduction in coverage in 1986; some Canadian manufacturers who
exported to the United States were unable to renew their coverage
at all. 30 In 1985, commercial liability insurance premiums
increased by 15% in Canada, as compared to 72% in the United
States.31 Per capita liability insurance premiums (excluding auto
insurance premiums) in Canada in 1985 were $16, as compared to
$60 in the U.S.32 These changes were reflected within a year by an
increase in the after-tax return on equity for property and casualty
insurers in Canada from 6.95% (2.94% in real terms) in 1985 to
15.77% (11.76% in real terms) in 1986, and 15.32% (11.23% in
real terms) in 1987.33
Thus, D&O liability insurance was but one of various liability
product lines to experience a severe supply squeeze in North
America beginning in 1985. Once again, although the Canadian
market was starting from a position of lower premiums, it
exhibited the same pattern of skyrocketing premiums, increased
deductibles, lower limits, increased exclusions, stricter claims
policies, and increased profits as did the U.S. market. As reported
in the 1987 Wyatt SurveY,34 for instance, D&O policy limits in the
U.S. fell markedly from 1984 to 1987, but still remained slightly
higher than their 1982 level. In Canada, the average policy limit
also fell and was, in fact, significantly lower in 1987 than in 1982.
The highest policy limit reported in the Wyatt Survey in 1987 for
U.S. respondents was 35% lower than in 1984, while the highest
Canadian limit had been reduced by 16%. Policy limits for
29 Ibid., at p. 936.
30 Ministry of Financial Institutions, Ontario Task Force on Insurance (1986), pp. 31-5, as
cited in Trebilcock, ibid., at p. 935.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 The Belton Report on Property and Casualty Insurance in Canada (Tillinghast, Toronto,
January, 1991) Vol. 2, No.3, p. 4.
34 Supra, footnote 24, at p. 57.
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coverage of the smallest companies, those with assets of less than
$25 million, fell by 18.3% in the United States and by 66.0% in
Canada between 1984 and 1987. Policy limits for the largest
companies, those with assets ofover $2 billion, fell by 14.9% in the
U.S. and by 17.8% in Canada. The biggest squeeze on coverage
seems to have taken place during the last quarter of 1985 and the
first quarter of 1986, when 67% of renewals were for lower limits
and the average reduction was 50%.
Accompanying the lower limits was a reduction in the range of
risks covered by the D&O insurance policies. As Table 1 shows,
there was an increase in the prevalence of exclusions of every kind
between 1984 and 1987 as well as the appearance of many new
policy exclusions. Some of the new exclusions appear to be for the
very situations which created the risk of liability in the first place.
As the 1987 Wyatt Survey points out, "little reason exists for
purchase of the insurance if all identifiable exposures are
excluded.35 To the extent to which the excluded risk is out of the
control of the corporation or its directors, the exclusion represents
a partial, if somewhat hidden, withdrawal of insurance. An
example of such a withdrawal is the exclusion for tender offers and
rejections, which was unknown in 1984 but was contained in 16%
of U.S. policies and 6% of Canadian policies in the 1987 Wyatt
Survey.36
35 Ibid., at p. 68.
36 An illustrative comment is contained in the 1987 Wyatt Survey, ibid., at p. 68: "To draw
an analogy, the exclusion of arson in a fire insurance policy would make sense, but it
would not make much sense to exclude all fires, including those originating outside of the
insured premises. Not unless the insurer just wants to avoid paying any claims."
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Table 137
Prevalence ofcertain exclusions ofliability in D&O policies in
. 1984 and 1987
Exclusion 1984 1987
Canada U.S. Canada U.S.
pending and prior litigation 44% 34% 71% 70%
pollution and environmental damage 59% 47% 91% 78%
mergers and acquisitions 11% 14%
tender offers and rejections 6% 16%
going private 3% 2%
public offerings 8% 4%
securities violations
(excl. "short swing") 22% 26%
securities transactions 23% 19%
failure to maintain insurance 16% 14% 55% 49%
joint ventures 11% 12%
general or limited partnerships 10% 12%
illegal payments or commissions 31% 21% 52% 51%
actions by regulatory agencies 17% 18%
insured v. insured 37% 28%
of which = claims by any insured 33% 23%
= claims by corporation 1% 2%
= claims by corporation
excluding derivative actions 2% 3%
Accompanying the decrease in the range of risks covered was a
move to decrease the period of time within which those risks
would be covered. Unlike most liability insurance, which covers
risks realized within the policy period regardless of when they are
actually reported ("occurrence-based"), D&O insurance has
always been provided on a "claims made" basis. That is, the
insurer covers insurable risks which are claimed within the policy
period, regardless of when the events giving rise to the claim
actually occurred.38 The cancellation of such a policy can lead to a
37 Data drawn from the 1987 Wyatt Survey, ibid., at pp. 68-9 and 73.
38 Claims-made policies are used for risks which the industry ca1ls "long-tailed" risks, that
is, risks involving a long period of time between the occurrence of the insured event and
the claim made. Where this delay leads to uncertainty as to the probable size and number
of claims, then occurrence policies become difficult to price, and insurers turn to claims-
made pOlicies as a way of reducing the uncertainty associated with the size and number of
the claims. Essentially, the long tail of the probability distribution of the risk realization
7-22 C.H.Ll.
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gap in coverage for the insured even if a replacement policy is
purchased elsewhere, because D&O policies, even though claims-
based, typically exclude coverage for events occurring prior to the
first policy period with a particular insurer.
To mitigate against this possible gap in coverage, most D&O
policies allow the insured the option of purchasing an "extended
discovery period" in the event that the insurer cancels or refuses to
renew the policy. An insured is then covered for incidents which
arise during the policy period, but which are reported after the end
of the insurance policy and before the end of the extended
discovery period. In both Canada and the United States, extended
discovery periods of 12 months were the norm in 1984, while by
1987 discovery periods of 90 days or less were common. 39
According to the Wyatt Co., this represented "a considerable
restriction of what is otherwise a very valuable policy right" .40
In order to attenuate moral hazard problems by insureds,
insurance policies of all kinds require that the insured pay a certain
amount of the insurable loss itself. 41 D&O policies are no
exception, and most policies in the early 1980s required that
insureds pay a set amount of any claim (the deductible) and also
that insureds pay a percentage of any claim above the deductible
amount (the retention).
After years of intense insurer competition in the soft market of
the early 1980s, the 5% retention had all but disappeared from
Canadian policies by 1984, as it had from Personal Coverage
policies in the U.S.42 This disappearance of the retention
continued, in fact, right through the crisis in both countries -
likely due to the demand by D&O insurance purchasers that their
insurance give full coverage for those risks which it still did cover.
Deductibles, which had also been declining during the early
is chopped off at the end of the policy period. (See the discussion at pp. 182-4 in Anthony
J. Falkowski, "Changes in State Regulation of Directors' and Officers' Insurance" in
Alan A. Harley, Chairman, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance 1989 (Practising
LawInstitute),p.179.
39 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra, footnote 24, at p. 71, Table 33.
40 Ibid., at p. 67.
41 This is merely the familiar problem of moral hazard - i.e., the fact that insurance
coverage may increase the probability and magnitude of a loss because protected
insureds have less of an incentive to take due care in averting the loss. For a basic intro-
duction to the concept of moral hazard (with some applications), see A. M. Polinsky, An
Introduction to Law and Economics (Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1983), chapter 7.
42 Fifteen percent of U.S. Corporate Reimbursement policies still had a retention in 1984.
(Data found in 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 87-8, Tables 44 and 45.)
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1980s, encountered a marked increase during the crisis. In
Canada, the average Personal Coverage deductible increased
from C$4,812 to C$6,456 (34%) between 1984 and 1987, while the
Corporate Reimbursement deductible increased from C$42,052 to
C$406,833 (867%) during the same period. In the United States,
the increases were even larger, with the average deductible for
Personal Coverage rising from US$4,989 to US$8,047 (61 %), and
the average Corporate Reimbursement deductible rising from
US$46,511 to US$649 ,947 (1297%).43
Probably the most dramatic symptom of the North American
D&O insurance crisis was the sudden and dizzying increase in
premiums; when coverage was available at all, it was available at
several times its previous cost. Due to the influence on premiums
of a host of factors, such as asset size, industry, and financial
history on premiums, it is not particularly helpful to compare
average premium costs per million dollars of coverage for all
survey participants from one year to the next. As a rough
indication of the magnitude of premium increases being imposed
by the primary insurers, however, the following table provides the
average premiums and percentage increases for selected groups of
companies with varying asset sizes and policy limits in the United
States and Canada.44
43 1987 Wyatt Survey, ibid., at p. 76 Exhibit 21. The fact that personal deductibles rose less
than corporate deductibles is understandable in light of the smaller resources of the
individual directors as compared to corporations. Corporations likely agreed to absorb
much larger deductibles in an effort to curb skyrocketing premiums by effectively self-in-
suring for part of the risk. There would have been much stiffer resistance to increased
deductibles for personal coverage, however, and corporations may have faced increased
difficulty in finding qualified directors had they agreed to trade deductibles for premiums
with respect to Personal Coverage.
44 Statistics derived from the 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 96-9, Tables 48
and 49. -
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A verage Annual Premium Costs by Size and Primary Policy
Limits: 1984 and 1987
Class o[Company 1984
Canada (C$)
assets: $25 to $100 million:
- $5 million policy limit
assets: $100 to $400 million:
- $5 million policy limit
- $10 million policy limit
assets: $400 to $1000 million:
- $10 million policy limit
assets: over $1000 million:
- $5 million policy limit
- $10 million policy limit
- $20 million policy limit
United States (US$)
assets: $25 to $50 million:
- $5 million policy limit $ 7,276 $ 30,530 320%
assets: $50 to $75 million:
- $5 million policy limit $ 5,802. $ 31,301 439%
assets: $75 to $100 million:
- $10 million policy limit $ 7,975 $ 43,152 441%
assets: $100 to $150 million:
- $5 million policy limit $ 6,004 $ 54,263 804%
- $10 million policy limit $12,398 $121,154 877%
assets: $250 to $400 million:
- $10 million policy limit $11,050 $ 83,391 655%
- $20 million policy limit $17,240 $163,249 853%
assets: $600 to $1000 million:
- $5 million policy limit $14,653 $128,972 780%
- $10 million policy limit $18,432 $364,574 1878%
- $25 million policy limit $23,040 $380,109 1549%
assets: $1500 to $2000 million:
- $10 million policy limit $13,799 $229,337 1562%
- $15 million policy limit $15,091 $328,413 2076%
The figures in Table 2 give an indication of the enormous
increase in the cost of D&O insurance faced by North American
corporations in 1985 and 1986, particularly those with larger asset
bases. The straight premium cost alone does not, however, take
into account the decrease in the amount of insurance that was
actually being supplied due to the increased deductibles and exclu.:
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sions and the decreased policy limits and discovery periods
mentioned above. In this light, the Wyatt Premium Index was
constructed to account for the differential impact of these factors,
as well as for asset size.
Taking 1974 as the base year of 100, the Wyatt Premium Index
stood at 71.2 in the United States and 58.6 in Canada in 1982. By
1984, the Index had fallen further, to 54.3 in the U.S. and 52.4 in
Canada, as insurers pared premiums to the bone. By 1987,
however, the U.S. Index stood at 682.4 and the Canadian Index
stood at 361.1. It can be seen, therefore, that the combined effect
of the increased prices and the more limited insurance available
for that price was to make D&O insurance roughly 13 times more
expensive for U.S. companies in 1987 than it had been in 1984, as
compared to roughly 7 times more expensive for Canadian
compames.
The existence of a "crisis" in D&O liability insurance in Canada
in the mid-1980s is therefore clearly indicated. The symptoms of
the crisis were similar to those ofthe crisis in the U.S. market, but
less severe in nature. Furthermore, the crisis in both markets must
be seen in the context of the concurrent crisis in North American
liability insurance generally, which again was less severe in
Canada than in the United States.
There are indications that the crisis was already easing by 1988,
and certainly by 1989, in both Canada and the United States. The
1988 U.S. Wyatt Survey45 and the 1989 Canadian Wyatt Survey46
show that the highest reported policy limits had rebounded
somewhat, to US$220 million and C$110 million, which were
slightly above their 1984 levels. Average policy limits in both
countries had stopped their decline, with a 1988 average of $23.6
million in the U.S. and $8.9 million in Canada. Personal Coverage
deductibles in Canada increased to C$15,834 from C$6,456 in
1989, while in the U.S. the most common personal deductible
dropped to US$5,000. Conversely, the average Canadian
Corporate Reimbursement deductible decreased to C$300,000 by
1989, while its U.S counterpart continued to rise, albeit at a slower
rate. The Wyatt Premium Index for the U.S. increased only 64
points to 746 in 1988. This weighted index was not reported for
45 1988 Wyatt Directors' and Officers' Liability Survey (the "1988 Wyatt Survey"), the
Wyatt Co. (Chicago, 1988).
46 1989 Wyatt Canadian Survey. supra, footnote 25.
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Canada in 1989, but the Wyatt Co. does report that: "Consistent
with a softer insurance market, a majority of participants
indicated that as premiums decreased, 1989 policy limits either
remained stable or were increased and exclusions were either
decreased or remained stable."47
Thus, although the D&O market in both countries has not
returned to anything like the prices and product available prior to
1984, the situation appears to have stabilized and some new
capacity is easing back into the market. Even so, policymakers in
the United States have been quick to introduce regulatory changes
intended to prevent the return of the severe supply crisis just
outlined.48 These changes have taken the form both of authorizing
corporate articles to limit the personal liability of directors for
monetary damages, and of statutes prescribing a standard of
conduct for which there is no liability.49 These policy responses
may not be appropriate for Canada, however, if the causes of the
crisis here were different from those in the U.S.
We now turn, therefore, to examine the principal hypotheses as
to the cause of the U.S. crisis in order to evaluate their applica-
bility in the Canadian context.
IV. EXPLANATIONS OF THE CANADIAN 0&0 INSURANCE CRISIS
Explanations of the crisis in the U.S. market for insurance,
extended to explain the D&O crisis, have generally focused on
factors endogenous and exogenous to the insurance industry.50
The former focus on the structure of the insurance industry, while
the latter include changes in the nature and intensity of economic
47 1989 Canadian Wyatt Survey, ibid., at p. 15. The Canadian Directors' and Officers'
Liability Survey 1991 (the "1991 Wyatt Canadian Survey"), the Wyatt Co. (Toronto,
1991), confirmed the easing of D&O availability during the 1989-91 period. Average
policy limits increased moderately from a low of C$8.9 million in 1989 to C$13.1 million
in 1991. Dramatic decreases in personal deductibles were reported, with the average
personal deductible falling from C$15,834 in 1989 to 03,844 in 1991. The average
corporate deductible remained fairly constant; however, this average belies substantial
increases for firms with assets less than C$1 billion and substantial decreases for larger
firms. The average premium per million dollars of coverage fell from 09,071 in 1989 to
C$7,243 in 1991. See the 1991 Wyatt Canadian Survey, at pp. 49-52.
48 See Falkowski, supra, footnote 38, at p. 179.
49 See Romano (1990), supra, footnote 8, at pp. 1160-5.
50 "We do not have a satisfactory understanding of the cause of the D&O insurance crisis.
But one does not have to dig very deep to conclude that any satisfactory explanation will
be multicausal." See Romano (1989), supra, footnote 8, at p. 32. See also Romano
(1988), supra, footnote 8.
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activity occurring during the mid-1980s as well as legal develop-
ments (both in terms of the enactment and interpretation of laws).
These explanations will be examined in the context of the
Canadian market for D&O insurance to determine their potential
role in the crisis of 1985-86.
1. Endogenous Explanations Based on the Structure of the 0&0
Market
(1) Industry Collusion
On March 22,1988, the Attorneys-General of eight U.S. states
filed federal antitrust suits against property-casualty insurers and
others, alleging the existence of a conspiracy to boycott sales of
liability insurance in the United States. Essentially, the claim
advanced is that by forming an industry cartel, insurers were able
to raise premiums and exclude less profitable lines ofcoverage. No
such formal accusations have been made in Canada. Still, it is
worthwhile to examine the structure of the Canadian D&O
insurance industry to see if such an explanation is plausible.
As Clarke has noted in the context of analyzing the U.S.
insurance market, collusive agreements can be expected to be
more effective the fewer the firms in the market, the easier it is to
police cheating members, the larger the market share of a few
large firms, the greater the barriers to market entry, and the fewer
the perfect substitutes that exist for the good.51 One statistic
commonly used to test the degree of concentration in an industry
is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (the "HHI"). The HHI index
is equal to the sum of the squares of the market share of each firm
in the market. Thus, the fewer firms there are in the market, and
the more unequal their market shares, the higher the index, which
ranges between 0 (infinite competition) and 10,000 (monopoly).
Romano found that the HHI in the United States was 900 for
reinsurers and 1600 for primary insurers based on the number of
accounts written, and 1100 for reinsurers and 2500 for primary
insurers based on premium volumes. According to the U.S.
Department of Justice's merger guidelines, these numbers
indicate only moderate concentration in the D&O insurance
market in the U.S.
51 Richard Clarke, Frederick Warren-Boulton, David Smith and Marilyn Simon, "Sources
ofthe Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis" (1988), 5 Yale J. on Reg. 367
atp.380.
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On the other hand, Romano also found that the four- and eight-
firm concentration ratios indicated the existence of a few leading
firms with roughly equal shares of the market, which could be
consistent with a market collusion hypothesis. However, the 1987
Wyatt Survey reported that many firms had exited from the D&O
market over the 1984-87 period, and that the market shares of
even the leading firms had changed. Significantly, the entry into
the market of new players, notably the policyholder-formed
companies which sprang up to alleviate the supply shortage in the
United States, attests to a highly competitive market in that
country.
The Canadian D&O market has fewer participants than the
U.S. market,52 which might make the collusion hypothesis more
plausible in this context. However, the 1987 Wyatt Survey also
noted significant changes in the market shares of the Canadian
industry leaders, as well as the withdrawal or decline of some of
the smaller firms. The Wyatt Co. concluded that "a large number
ofaccounts previously handled by the Continental Group, Gestas,
Home, Crum & Forster, and others have been picked up by
Chubb or the Encon Pool, rather than by [former market leader]
AIG".53
It is true that new market entrants in the form of policyholder-
formed D&O insurers or reinsurers were not as common in
Canada as in the U.S. during the crisis. In addition, only one
reinsurer (ACE) was operating at the retail level in 1987, with
17.9% of the premium volume, as compared to 11 such insurers in
the United States, with 49.8% of the premium volume. This may
be due to the higher entry costs relative to the size of the market,
and indicates that industry collusion is possible. However,
evidence of significant movements in Canadian market shares
during the crisis serves to refute this theory. Indeed, with respect
to the Canadian non-life insurance industry in general, the Office
of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada draws the
conclusion that "the property and casualty insurance industry is
extremely cyclical and volatile, mostly because prices are set in a
marketplace made up of a large number of competitors."54
52 The 1987 Wyatt Survey lists only nine primary carriers of D&O insurance with a
premium market share of 1% or more in Canada in 1987, as compared to 12 in the United
States (1987 Wyatt SUIvey, supra, footnote 24, at pp. 111 and 115, Tables 55 and 59).
531987WyattSurvey,ibid.,atp.110.
54 Annual Report 1989, Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada
(October, 1989), p. 15.
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The collusion theory must also be rejected on theoretical
grounds since, as Winter points out, collusion cannot account for
the complete withdrawal of some firms from the D&O market:
"Firms do not, according to any known theory, establish a cartel
to increase profits by completely withdrawing from a subset of
segmented markets. "55 In this vein, the 1987 Wyatt Survey reports
that the Canadian market saw the decline of the Continental
Insurance Group (Harbor and Buffalo Re) as a significant factor
in the D&O market, and the complete withdrawal of Gestas,
which had had a market share of 12.8% in 1984.
Based on the evidence, therefore, the crisis in Canadian D&O
insurance cannot be said to have been the result of collusion by the
insurers in an attempt to increase their profits by restricting
supply. A more plausible explanation is, in fact, centred on the
highly competitive nature of the insurance industry.
(2) Competitive Cycles in the Insurance Industry
The cyclical nature of the insurance industry has long been the
subject of observation and commentary, and economists have
developed an explanation of the "boom-bust" cycle of premiums
and availability that is consistent with the observed competition in
the industry. Winter56 refines this economic theory to explain both
the confinement of the crisis to the liability lines of insurance and
the suddenness with which the crisis developed. Briefly, he argues
that the crisis in liability insurance was brought about by the
operation of the insurance cycle in reaction to supply shocks
emanating from the United States tort system and the global
reinsurance system. These shocks and the reasons for the vulnera-
bility of the Canadian industry to foreign shocks are explained in
Part IV, 1(3) below. First, however, Winter's theory of compet-
itive insurance cycles should be investigated more closely.
According to neoclassical economic theory, the law of large
numbers means that premiums for any type of insurance should
equal the expected value of future claims (probability times
magnitude of the claim) under the policy, plus loading costs.57 So
55 Winter (1988), supra, footnote 27, at p. 480. See Trebilcock, supra, footnote 15, at pp.
936-7.
56 Winter, ibid.; see also Ralph A. Winter, "The Liability Insurance Market" , presented at
the Conference on the Law and Economics of Liability, Stanford Law School, (May,
1990), at pp. 8-13.
57 G. Priest, "The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law" (1987), 96 Yale L.J.
1521 at p. 1540.
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long as risks are independent, that is, uncorrelated, insurers are
risk-neutral because they can diversify away these risks by
pooling. If capital markets are efficient then even dependent
insurance risks can be hedged by insurer shareholders against the·
capital markets and efficiently insured by the insurance market.
Thus, only risks which are systematically related to macroeco-
nomic factors or the return on the aggregate stock market
portfolio are truly non-diversifiable and therefore uninsurable.58
The traditional insurance market model with perfect capital
markets cannot, therefore, explain the sudden withdrawal of
capacity from liability lines apparently unconnected with general
economic events.
It is tempting to blame the general insurance crisis on the
expansion of tortious liability and the escalation of damage awards
by the courts in recent years. To invoke burgeoning liability as an
explanation for the general insurance crisis, it is necessary,
following Knight, to show that the future levels of liability are not
merely risky but so uncertain as to be unpredictable. 59 Trebilcock
relies on uncertainties in the application of existing legal rules,
fuelled by the judiciary's oscillation between compensation and
deterrence objectives, to explain the general insurance crisis.60 In
a similar vein, Priest has developed an explanation for the
insurance crisis that is rooted in judicial embracement of the
Calebresian internalization paradigm, which has caused insurance
markets to unravel through a process of adverse selection.61
58 Winter (1988), supra, footnote 27, at p. 468.
59 F. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston and New York, Riverside Press, 1921),
pp. 197-263. Were these changes predictable, insurers would be able to impound these
risks into their premium pricing, generating, at worst, rapid increases in premium levels
without any withdrawal ofcoverage.
60 Trebilcock, supra, footnote 15.
61 The concept of enterprise liability is developed in G. Calabresi, The Costs ofAccidents:
A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970). See
also A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California,
University of California Press, 1951). For a history of the theory of enterprise liability,
see G. Priest, "The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intel-
lectual Foundations of Modem Tort Law" (1985), 14 J. Legal Stud. 461. The link
between enterprise liability and the 1980s insurance crisis is developed in Priest, supra,
footnote 57. According to Priest, the use of tort law to insure third-party claimants
against misfortune rather than merely to compensate them for wrongdoing and, hence,
to deter such behaviour, entails the widening of risk pools to the point at which low-risk
policyholders drop out, the risk pools unravel, and eventually insurers refuse to insure at
a price which policyholders are willing to pay (see Part 2., infra). For a recent critique of
Priest's analysis, see S. Croley and J. Hanson, "What Liability Crisis? An Alternative
Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability" (1991), 8 Yale J. on Reg. 1.
HeinOnline -- 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 203 1993
1993] Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis 203
However, as Winter observes, the legal uncertainty explanation
for the insurance crisis cannot explain the increase in insurer
profits which accompanied the crisis, nor the suddenness of its
onset.62 To explain these aspects, it is necessary to consider the
interaction of the supply shocks caused by, for example, the
changing face of tort law and the global reinsurance crisis, with the
time lags and constraints acting upon the insurance industry.63
Winter's insurance industry explanation for the general
insurance crisis draws on the fact that the insurance industry has
historically been subject to cycles in product availability. The
existence of these cycles can be traced to exogenous shocks that
operate upon an industry characterized by rigid production
capacity constraints and significant adjustment costs. These
constraints are related to statutory capital adequacy standards
which require insurance companies to maintain a certain ratio of
premiums to equity. Because changes in future levels of insured
risk increase the expected value of claims, and therefore premium
levels, statutorily prescribed levels of equity will have to increase
in order to cover premium increases.
In a world of perfect capital markets, insurance companies
should have little difficulty in sourcing new equity. However,
Winter notes that raising additional equity capital is not costless.
Corporate dividends in both Canada and the United States are
subject to a form of double taxation,64 so equity cannot be
costlessly removed once invested. Further, asymmetries of infor-
mation exist between managers of insurance companies and the
capital markets as to the nature of the market opportunities.
Because the sale of equity interests in the firm can be interpreted
as a sign of management's lack of faith in the future prospects of
the company, investors may not believe that an equity call is
62 Winter (1988), supra, footnote 27, at pp. 464-5.
63 Ibid., at pp. 474-6.
64 Dividends are paid from after-tax income, and have already been subjected to income
tax when they are distributed, yet shareholders must usually pay income tax on the same
dividends when they are received. This amounts to "double taxation" of the dividend
income. This problem is eliminated in Canada for Canadian corporations which own
shares in other Canadian corporations through the allowance of deductions to offset the
Canadian dividend income. When dividends are eventually paid to individual share-
holders, however, the dividend tax credit fails to completely eliminate the individuals'
tax liability and some degree of double taxation of corporate profits persists. (ITA,
supra, footnote 22, ss. 82, 112, 121).
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motivated by increased future insurance risks (as opposed to risks
of poor corporate management) and may discount the price they
are willing to pay for the shares. Moreover, there are always
agency costs involved with any request for investors to give up
control of their capital.65 It will, therefore, generally be more
efficient for an insurance company to increase its equity through
accumulating retained earnings as opposed to raising fresh equity
on the capital markets. Thus, according to Winter ,66 anytime the
"capacity ceiling" on insurance volume is hit, a period of high
premiums, high profits and even lower volumes will follow until
capacity reaches its appropriate level.
Winter uses the insurance cycle model to explain not only
capacity reductions, but the suddenness of the onset of the crisis as
well. According to Winter,67 at volumes of insurance below the
industry capacity constraint, the supply of insurance will be very
elastic. A series of insurer losses occasioned by changing tort law
or by unforeseen losses arising from events such as the American
asbestos litigation or the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal will not
immediately occasion an increase in premiums. Only when
capacity is sufficiently depleted for the premium/equity ratio
ceiling to be reached will the supply become inelastic, causing
premiums to rise rather suddenly.68 Furthermore, since the
surplus can still earn a normal rate of return in the capital market,
insurance availability will be slow to contract in response to an
external shock. There will be a tendency for the "soft" markets to
be rather protracted, therefore, while the high profits during the
crisis serve to generate retained earnings and also attract some
equity capital (double taxation of dividends does not discourage
equity in insurance more than in any other industry) so that
"tight" markets should be relatively short.
The fact that the general insurance crisis was restricted to
liability, as opposed to property lines of insurance, can be
explained by the fact that liability insurance is subject to greater
65 Even insurance subsidiaries of conglomerates face problems in obtaining equity from
within the conglomerate group. Other companies within the group may be unable to
invest in the insurance company owing to the non-fungible nature of the physical business
assets.
66 Winter (1988), supra, footnote 27, at p. 484.
67 Ibid., at p. 480.
68 "Crises of rapidly rising premiums tend to follow periods of stable premiums and low
returns and result from cumulative losses in the market rather than contemporaneous
shocks to the market." Winter, ibid.
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uncertainty than other lines. The higher uncertainty associated
with liability risks makes the supply more inelastic once capacity
constraints are reached. The response to shocks to capacity will
therefore be more volatile than for property lines, as capital treats
liability lines as "residual" and flows in and out in response to
small changes in price. Thus, the "multiproduct nature of the
insurance market is critical in explaining the magnitude of the
effect of capacity cycles for these lines".69 This theory has consid-
erable saliency in explaining the withdrawal of coverage in D&O
insurance; because specialty lines of insurance like D&O require
more expertise to write, and suffer from greater uncertainty than
other lines due to the relatively small number of claims and
policies, the effect of external shocks on availability is that much
more profound.7o
The 1985-86 crisis in Canadian D&O insurance can thus be seen
as the manifestation of a competitive response to capacity shocks
impacting on an already highly competitive market. These shocks
were initially absorbed, but eventually led to a sudden increase in
premiums and profits, and a regeneration of equity capacity. The
sudden increase in premiums has been documented. Separate
profit figures for the D&O line are not published, but they can be
assumed to have followed the increase in profits from all liability
lines in 1986 and 1987, as outlined above.
This explanation rests, however, on the vulnerability of the
Canadian insurance market to capacity shocks coming from the
United States and Europe. If the Canadian insurance market is
truly competitive, and the factors causing the capacity shocks are
not present in Canada, then one would expect the Canadian
industry to generate or attract its own capital and so avoid the
crisis.
69 Ibid., at p. 487.
70There is, in fact, evidence that the industry is currently gearing up for another "hard
market" in the liability lines, as a renewed glut of insurance equity is leading to price wars
that will culminate in a sudden withdrawal of capacity in the most vulnerable lines. The
Belton Report, supra, footnote 33, at p. 1, warned in January, 1991, that
Although prices should be rising, surplus capacity is holding increases in check.
When increases do occur, they will be selective and undramatic. They will be
triggered by a loss ratio which has risen so high that it is causing an erosion of the
capital supporting a particular class of business or by an unacceptable [return on
equity]. That day is approaching, but the timing of the correction depends very
much on the direction taken by the growth rate of premiums and claims over the
next two or three quarters.
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Winter blamed the capacity shocks in the United States on
changes in tort law and on changes in the global reinsurance
market. These issues will now be addressed in tum to determine
whether there is any reason to believe that either of these factors
could have impacted on the Canadian market through the compet-
itive market mechanisms outlined above.
(3) Global Reinsurance Crisis
As noted earlier, the supply side of the insurance market is
composed of several layers: the primary insurer, with whom a
policy is written and who usually absorbs claims up to a certain
amount, and the reinsurer, who absorbs claims in excess of the
primary layer amount. Although seldom observed by consumers,
reinsurers are vital to the insurance business. First, since
reinsurers actually pay insurers a ceding commission for the
business, they increase insurers' access to working capital.
Second, the existence of reinsurers greatly increases the capacity
of the primary insurers to write business, since, historically, only
the retained liability counts against the primary insurers' equity
capacity. Third, reinsurance allows primary insurers to diversify
their own risks, thereby reducing the premium costs to insureds.
Finally, by absorbing the excess in abnormally large claims,
reinsurers (who tend to be much larger than the primary insurance
companies) provide support and stability for the primary
insurance market.
The rapid expansion of the insurance business during the early
1980s was in fact fuelled in large part by a huge increase in
reinsurance capacity.71 For instance, in 1970, there were only 20
licensed reinsurance companies in Canada, compared to 45 in
1985, with a further 12 primary insurers operating reinsurance
departments.72 The profits to be earned by investing premiums at
the high interest rates of the early 1980s encouraged existing
reinsurers to expand and new entrants to enter the business.
Newcomers to the market could get an "instant" premium
portfolio by reinsuring a cross-section of another reinsurer's book.
If the reinsurers themselves re-reinsured with other reinsurers
71 John Lock, "Reinsurance as a substitute for capital", Canadian Insurance/Agent and
Broker, July, 1986,p. 17.
72 Robert Parizeau, "Reinsurers seek survival in tough times market", Canadian
Underwriter, April, 1985, p. 58 at p. 59.
HeinOnline -- 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 207 1993
1993] Directors' and Officers' Insurance Liability Crisis 207·
(known as "retrocessionaires"), they would themselves be paid
override commissions from the retrocessionaires.
Not surprisingly, not all of the reinsurers acted with the utmost
caution in their quest for quick investment profits. Because many
reinsurers operate across multiple jurisdictions, they can escape
the level of regulatory scrutiny reserved for primary insurers. In a
setting of regulatory gaps, some smaller reinsurers underwrote
more business than their capital could comfortably allow.
Eventually, when these reinsurers failed, primary insurers were
left with the responsibility of paying out on the entire amount of
the policies they had written - a rather onerous responsibility.
The problems for reinsurers were compounded by the failure of
some primary insurers to underwrite insured risks adequately in
the first place. Reinsurers found themselves paying out claims for
which an adequate premium had never been charged. It may seem
unlikely that, in such a sophisticated market, the reinsurers would
fall prey to unscrupulous insurers. However, there are many
layers in the insurance market, with agency costs and imperfect
information flows involved at each level. This asymmetry of infor-
mation is particularly pronounced in the commercial liability lines
where each policy is underwritten separately. Since the reinsurer
has no contact with the clients, it must trust the wisdom of the
insurer to underwrite the risk prudently. With investment profits
beckoning to offset any underwriting losses, and intense compe-
tition amongst insurers driving prices ever downward, prudent
underwriting standards were not always maintained. The lag
between the payment of premiums and the realization of claims
meant that it was some time before reinsurers realized the
problem. Thus, it seems that the root of the problem was the
familiar insurance pitfall of moral hazard: retail insurers had not
been required to retain any significant portion of the risks which
they were writing and so had not maintained the most prudent
pricing and underwriting standards.?3 These problems, combined
with the fact that the uncertainty involved in pricing excess policies
is inherently much greater than at the primary level, meant that
many reinsurers slowly dug themselves into holes from which they
could not escape.74
73 "Reinsurers are no different from insurers. The more they keep for themselves, the more
they are careful in their underwriting practices.... Many problems developed because
insurance companies could reinsure just about anything without retaining a significant
interest." Ibid., at p. 58.
74 "The market has become increasingly undisciplined and some of the most basic
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In this setting, it was the avalanche of asbestos, medical
malpractice and product-liability claims in the United States that
actually sparked the insurance crisis. These claims frequently
exceeded the primary layer of insurance retained by the retail
insurers, forcing reinsurers to absorb losses for which they were
not adequately prepared, and for which they had not extracted
adequate compensation. Given the possibilities of international
diversification, one would have thought that reinsurers would not
be vulnerable to the explosion of liability in the United States.
That is, by reinsuring the risks of non-American companies, the
non-systematic risks occasioned by jurisdiction-specific legal
changes could be diversified away. However, the fact that many
European and Japanese firms were subject to this burgeoning
liability by virtue of their exports to the American market,
combined with the simultaneous occurrence of severe storm
damage in Europe and Japan in 1987,75 effectively transformed
these non-systematic risks into non-diversifiable systematic ones.
To recoup their losses and to restore capacity, the larger
reinsurers were forced to increase prices, while reducing the
amount of new business they wrote. Some smaller reinsurers
failed. The reduction in the capacity at the reinsurance level was
only magnified at the level of the primary insurers, who suddenly
could not find reinsurance sufficient to allow them to write the
same amount of business. For large risks such as those insured in
D&O policies, the lack of reinsurance was particularly devastating
since the smaller insurance companies could no longer diversify
the non-systematic risks.
It is through the mechanism of the reinsurance market that
many of the insurance trends extant in the United States were
transmitted to Canada. In Canada, this industry is principally
populated by foreign-owned firms. The October 1989 Annual
Report of the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions (OSF!) states that less than 30% of the business
written by federally regulated companies, which account for about
85% of the Canadian property and casualty insurance market, is
conducted by domestically controlled insurers.76 Indeed, only
principles have been forsaken.... With the delays involved in international reinsurance
accounting, it took a long time before the players realized they were sitting on a time
bomb." Ibid., at p. 59.
75 "Reinsurance Challenge: How to Remain a Top Player", Canadian Underwriter,
November, 1988, p. 12 at p. 13; and "The Changing World of Reinsurance", Canadian
Underwriter, November, 1990, p.13 at pp.13-14.
76 Supra, footnote 54, at p. 15.
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about 6.5% of the premiums written by reinsurers operating in the
Canadian property-casualty market (excluding companies dealing
solely with accident and sickness insurance) in 1985 were written
by Canadian-owned companies.77 As numerous industry commen-
tators have noted, the huge U.S. market is serviced by companies
from all nations, and U.S. and other foreign reinsurers alike were
under intense pressure to recoup some of the losses sustained on
their American policies. Even though Canadian insureds had a
risk profile distinct from their American counterparts, these
differences were not taken into account by reinsurers.78
Trebilcock rejects the proposition that defects in the interna-
tional reinsurance market account in any appreciable measure for
the insurance crisis in Canada.79 Stated simply, Trebilcock argues
that, in the absence of any sustainable entry barriers, any effort by
foreign reinsurers operating in the Canadian market to raise
premiums above levels appropriate to the Canadian environment
would be met with competitive entry. That is, new competitors
would flood the market with reinsurance capacity geared to the
actual risk of Canadian insureds, thereby thwarting any efforts to
make Canadian insureds responsible for American losses.
Trebilcock's reluctance to cede to reinsurance markets a central
role in the Canadian insurance crisis neglects, however, the
presence of natural entry barriers to reinsurance markets, namely
the relatively small size of the Canadian market and the inability
of new entrants to make statistically robust projections of future
liability on the basis of the scant claims data available in Canada.
In order for the law of large numbers to operate to render
reinsurers risk-neutral with respect to the policies they reinsure, it
77 Canadian Underwriter, May Statistical Issue, 1986, at pp. 42 and 128-42. Data on
insurance company ownership on file with the authors.
78 The fact that foreign companies came under intense pressure to raise premiums in an
effort to compensate for problems at home is a theme that was frequently sounded by
Canadian industry commentators. As Robert Parizeau, supra, footnote 72, at p. 60, has
noted: "In Canada, the reinsurance market is made up of subsidiaries or branches of
foreign companies. Managers in Canada were under strict instructions to make their
portfolios profitable and to take whatever steps were necessary to achieve that goal."
This assessment was shared by Harold K. Ballantyne in "Plotting a Course in Turbulent
Seas", Canadian Underwriter, September, 1985, p. 14 at p. 23:
For example, in reinsurance it appears that Canadian branches and subsidiaries of
international corporations are subject to control from elsewhere, and that while lip-
service is paid to the apparent difference of this market to others they are subjected
to outside pressures and decisions taken which reflect results in foreign markets.
79 Trebilcock, supra, footnote 15, at p. 938.
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seems that a market much larger than that of the Canadian market
for D&O liability insurance must be considered.80 In the absence
of statistically robust Canadian data, a natural referent is, of
course, the United States. Thus, reinsurers and insurers alike look
to the U.S. experience when assessing Canadian risks. They are
included with U.S. risks so that the entire North American market
can be assessed with the law of large numbers operating intact.
In these terms, the liability insurance crisis facing Canada in the
mid-1980s can be traced back to a reinsurance capacity crisis
stemming from underpricing in a highly competitive market and
dramatic changes in tort liability in the United States. The
reinsurance crisis affected Canada both because foreign insurers
- however improperly - tend to assume that Canada follows the
U.S. lead in all matters including legal liability for torts, and
because there is insufficient market size in Canada to support an
independent evaluation of reinsurance risks.
The protracted crisis in D&O can in turn be traced to its position
as a specialty line of insurance, with a very small market base in
Canada, and policy terms that tend to be individualized, all of
which mean that this line is particularly uncertain and the first to
lose capacity in a crunch. Just as Winter's theory predicted that the
capacity constraints would affect the availability of liability
insurance more than the less volatile property lines, so within
liability insurance it was the more volatile and uncertain lines such
as D&O which saw the largest reduction in capacity and the
slowest recovery.81
The linkage of the Canadian D&O market to that of the United
States and to worldwide events in liability reinsurance is obviously
80 For instance, the premium volume of the top six Canadian liability insurance companies
is about $13 to $14 billion, while one U.S. company alone, State Farm, writes about $20
billion annually. Further, the entire liability reinsurance premium in Canada is unlikely
to exceed more than $900 million. Interview with Guy Couture and Mary Holland of
Sodarcan Inc., April 30, 1991.
81 Canadian Underwriter magazine reported in March, 1988, that: "Capacity is becoming
adequate for most lines of insurance with the notable exception ofdirectors' and officers'
cover, which has low capacity and is overpriced" (Stuart Brooks, "Risk managers'
rousing theme: Happier Days are Here Again" , Canadian Underwriter, March, 1988, p.
18). In April, 1988, the magazine reported that: "Rate increases in 1985 and 1986,
together with a capacity shrinkage for certain classes, culminated in substantially
improved results during 1987. But even as these improved results were being reported,
the industry began to witness competitive forces similar to those of the early 1980's...
There does not appear to be relief in sight for those who require cover for professional
liability or directors and officers and the like." See Rex Anthony, Anthony Insurance
Inc., "Go-ahead, back-up blues", Canadian Underwriter, April, 1988, p. 36 at p. 39.
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not the entire story, however, since the severity of the "crisis" was
less pronounced in Canada than in the U.S. Clearly, therefore, the
domestic legal and business environment does have some
influence on the supply of liability insurance in general and D&O
insurance in particular in Canada. It has been suggested by
Trebilcock that Canada suffered from the same increase in both
the incidence and level of tort liability awards as was manifest in
the United States, but to a lesser degree. The possibility that
changing legal standards in the D&O context could have influ-
enced the steep rise in premiums and the withdrawal of capacity in
Canada will now be examined.
2. Changes in the Exogenous Environment
There is some evidence that changes in the exogenous
environment effected the Canadian D&O market. Table 3, below,
indicates that the claims exposure of Canadian companies, both in
terms of the likelihood and severity of potential claims, increased
significantly from 1984 to 1987. The susceptibility of a firm to
experiencing at least one claim over the preceding period, as well
as the overall frequency of claims per firm during the same years
fell markedly after 1987, while_ average settlement and defence
costs fell slightly only after 1989.
Table 382
Trends in Claim Susceptibility, Frequency, Settlements and
Defence Costs: 1984-1991
1984 1987 1989 1991
susceptibility 9.0% 10.5% 5% 6.6%
frequency 0.18 0.38 (+ 111%) 0.07 (-82) 0.18 (+ 157)
final settlements $115,789 $255,432 $371,571 $301,894
paid defence costs $63;155 $134,120 $344,412 $257,498
total final costs
of claim $178,944 $389,552 $715,983 $559,384
The timing of these increases in the frequency and severity of
claims roughly corresponds to that of the symptoms discussed in
Part IV, 1(3), above, of the CanadianD&O crisis. The doubling of
the frequency and severity of claims between 1984 and 1987,
82 1991 Wyatt Canadian Survey, supra, footnote 47, at p. 53, Exhibit 17.
HeinOnline -- 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 212 1993
212 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 22
however, cannot account entirely for the seven-fold increase in the
Wyatt Premium Index (the premiums weighted by losses of
coverage) during that period. None the less, the increase in the
claims experienced was not insignificant and can be traced to
exogenous changes in the legal and business environment.
One of the principal causes identified by Priest and Trebilcock
ofthe liability insurance crisis in the United States was the product
liability crisis in the United States. Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, the courts moved to impose liability on corporations for the
toxic side-effects of their products, regardless of whether the toxic
effects were or could have been foreseen at the time of sale. The
well-known asbestos cases and those connected with the Dalkon
shield resulted in millions of dollars of liability for insurers who
had neither charged nor taken reserves for such risks.83 In some
cases, the fact that the corporate defendant possessed insurance
while the plaintiff did not was enough to trigger liability in the
defendant on the "deep pocket" theory. There was also a percep-
tible move towards expanding the notion of fault in negligence
cases, a move motivated, it seemed, by the desire to compensate
victims who did not have first-party insurance and would
otherwise not have been compensated for their misfortune. In
effect, tort law came to be used as a means to compensate victims
of misfortune - that is, to provide third-party liability insurance
- rather than merely to deter wrongdoing and provide an
incentive to take appropriate precautions against harming third
parties.
According to Trebilcock, the changes in tort law led not to
better coverage but to a perverse decrease in coverage as insurers
responded to the changes by withdrawing capacity from the
liability lines:84
. .. attempts to pursue deterrence objectives and compensation (social
83 Other lesser known examples include Bristol-Myers' Kantrex and Upjohn's neomycin
drugs for deafness and the oral contraceptive Ortho-Novum 2 mg., manufactured by
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. See, respectively, Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S. W.
2d 801 (Tex., 1978), and Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F. 2d 652 (1st Cir.,
1981). But note that the same court which found Johns-Manville Product Corp. liable for
the unforeseeable toxic effects of the asbestos it manufactured later seemed to reverse
itself on the issue of whether a defendant could be liable for the unforeseen and unfore-
seeable side-effects of its products. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429,
479 A. 2d 374 (1984). See also Rabin, "Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment
on Calabresi and Klevorick" (1985), 14J. Legal Stud. 633 at p. 635.
84 Trebilcock, supra, footnote 15, at pp. 929-30.
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insurance) objectives simultaneously through a single legal instrument -
the tort system - entail unresolvable contradictions that have destabilized
the system and its associated private insurance arrangements, especially with
the increasingly widespread espousal of a social insurance objective for the
tort system.
The system was destabilized because the expansion of liability to
include risks unforeseeable at the time of manufacture meant that
risks were no longer probabilistic - that is, the risks for which
insurance was being made to compensate would have been
uninsurable when the policy was written. Also, as Priest explains,
the switch to third-party from first-party coverage resulted in
excessive coverage, including damages for non-pecuniary loss for
which no first party would purchase insurance. More importantly,
however, the move restricted the degree to which risks could be
segregated into narrow risk pools. The result was the unravelling
of the risk pools as the low-risk corporations found it cheaper to
self-insure than to pay the same premiums as those for whom
potential product liability was high. As Priest notes, "the refusal
of some insurers to offer coverage at all for day care, municipal,
and directors' and officers' liability, among others, is conclusive
evidence of the breakdown of the insurance function. ' '85
In the case of D&O liability, Romano has argued that an exami-
nation of U.S. law relating to D&O liability for negligence shows
not a period of radical expansion in liability standards but rather a:
period of stagnation and possibly reduction in the standard
required.86 Liability for insider trading and other securities trans-
gressions expanded during the 1960s and 1970s, but "the trend of
expanding liability was reversed ... by the mid-1970s with a line
of Supreme Court rulings cutting back the reach of the federal
securities laws. "87 And although the decision of the Delaware
Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Smith v. Van Gorkom88
was viewed by some commentators as marking a significant
enlargement of directorialliability,89 Romano argues that the real
85 Priest, supra, footnote 57, at p. 1578.
86 Romano (1989), supra, footnote 8, at pp. 22-5.
f57 Ibid., at p. 22.
88 488 A.2d 858 (Del., 1985). The case involved a decision by the directors of a target
company to approve a merger of the firm without having undertaken due consideration
of the adequacy of the offered price. The directors in question had been fully briefed on
the company's tax problems and had commissioned an independent study on alternative
methods of dealing with the problem, but had made the fatal mistake of failing to
commission an independent valuation of the company. Instead, they had relied on their
collective business experience and the estimates of one of their colleagues at the crucial
board meeting.
89 See, for instance, B. Manning, "Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom
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significance of the case lay not in the actual standard of liability
applied (gross rather than simple negligence which constituted a
reduction in the standard of care), but in the court's willingness to
find liability on the facts of the case, which created considerable
uncertainty in the business and legal community respecting the
way in which the gross negligence standard would be applied by
the Delaware courts.90
Another factor identified by Romano as contributing to the
uncertain liability faced by American directors and officers was
the rapid and extensive· expansion of financial innovations in the
1980s. With new takeover and financing techniques being devised
at a rapid rate, it became extremely difficult to predict how the
courts would apply the legal standard for liability in any given
situation.91
The last factor identified by Romano as a source of uncertainty
in American D&O markets was the lawless interpretation of
insurance contracts by the courts. 92 Despite relatively clear
contractual language indicating the allocation of certain risks to
insureds, the American judiciary has consistently refused to read
these provisions in their proper light. As a consequence, exclusion
clauses and other limitations on coverage were narrowed, thereby
increasing the scope (and unpredictability) of insurer liability.
This uncertainty in the D&O market in the United States can be
expected to have had some spillover effect on Canada simply
because of the importance of trading links between the two
after Van Gorkom" (1985),41 Business Lawyer 1 at p. 1: "[Van Gorkom] exploded a
bomb. . .. Stated minimally, the· court there pierced the business judgment rule and
imposed individual liability on independent (even eminent) outside directors. The
corporate bar generally views the decision as atrocious. Commentators predict dire
consequences as directors come to realize how exposed they have become."
90 Romano (1989), supra, footnote 8, at pp. 24-5.
91 In this vein, Romano has argued, ibid., at p. 25, that
Corporate practice in recent years has been characterized by rapid-paced
innovation in the structuring of deals, and new claims, such as objections to the
latest takeover defensive tactic, are continually being brought against directors.
Because litigation in this environment will inevitably raise numerous complex issues
involving application of the liability standard, the variance of the standard will
increase, making D&O losses more difficult to predict ... this type of legal uncer-
tainty affects all insureds and thereby creates a dependence across D&O risks,
vitiating the applicability of the law of large numbers toD&O policies' pricing. The
upshot of the phenomenon is that the increased uncertainty in D&O risk assessment
can cause rates to rise even though the apparent core of the standard of conduct has
remained the same.
92 Ibid., at pp. 25-30.
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countries. There are many ways in which the directors of a
Canadian company can be exposed to liability in the United
States. Among the more common are for the Canadian company
to sell goods and services directly to U.S. customers, to establish
an American subsidiary, or to trade its shares on aU.S. stock
exchange. In fact, the 1989 Canadian Wyatt Survey found that
"those participants with U.S. subsidiaries_reported claims at more
than twice the rate of firms that did not have subsidiaries. "93
Although the Wyatt Canadian Surveys do not report on the claims
experience of participants who sell products or services or trade
shares in the U.S. without a subsidiary, it is reasonable to assume
that they have been exposed to the greater frequency of claims in
that country, and to the more stringent standard of conduct
imposed by its courts.
Not all Canadian purchasers of D&O insurance trade in or with
the United States, however, and it is relevant to our investigation
of the Canadian D&O market to determine whether exogenous
shifts in the Canadian environment increased the level, and hence
the uncertainty, of the liability of directors and officers within
Canada. This issue will be canvassed by considering changes in the
standards of care and loyalty imposed by corporate and securities
law, in the standards of conduct prescribed in non-corporate law
statutes such as environmental and employment standards legis-
lation, and in the level and nature of economic activity in Canada
during the mid-1980s.
A central theme of this discussion is that, although there has
been some accretion in the level of liability imposed on directors
from non-corporate and securities sources, by and large, close
inspection provides little support for believing that the crisis in
Canadian D&O insurance had much to do with indigenous
Canadian trends. This underscores the salience of the reinsurance
story as the principal cause of the Canadian D&O crisis and also
provides an explanation for its lesser severity.
93 Supra, footnote 25, at p. 46. The 1991 Wyatt Canadian Survey, supra, footnote 47, at p.
39, reported that Canadian firms with U.S. subsidiaries were by then more than three
times as likely to experience one or more 0&0 claims as those without. Exhibit 26 shows
that Canadian respondents without U.S. subsidiaries had a claim susceptibility
(percentage of participants with one or more claims over 1979-1988) of just over 3%,
while those with a wholly owned subsidiary or an interest in a subsidiary had a claims
susceptibility of about 9% and 5% respectively. Similarly, the claims frequency (average
number ofclaims per participant over 1979-1988) for companies without subsidiaries was
about 5%, while that ofcompanies with wholly owned and partly owned subsidiaries was
about 12.5% and 10.5% respectively.
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(1) Developments in Directors' Corporate and Securities Law
Duties
In contrast to the situation obtaining in the United States, where
the traditional legal duties of directors to the corporation are
principally derived from state corporate law, in Canada these
duties are derived from both corporate and securities law
sources.94 The traditional degree of duty and skill required of
directors under Anglo-Canadian corporate law was established by
Romer J. in 1924 in the seminal case of City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co. (Re):95
It has been laid down that so long as a director acts honestly he cannot be
made responsible in damages unless guilty of gross or culpable negligence in
the business sense.
There are . . . one or two other general propositions that seem to be
warranted by the reported cases: (1) a director need not exhibit in the
performance of his duties a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be
expected from a person of his knowledge and experience.... directors are
not liable for mere errors in judgment. (2) A director is not bound to give
continuous attention to the affairs of his company.... (3) In respect of all
duties that, having regard to the exigencies of business, and the articles of
association, may properly be left to some other official, a director is, in the
absence of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform
such duties honestly.
Thus, the traditional English test required that the director behave
in an objectively reasonable manner, based on his or her own
subjective state of knowledge and skill. Not surprisingly, given the
heavy subjective content to the standard, courts have rarely held
directors responsible for breaches of the corporate law duty of
care.96
94 R. Daniels and J. MacIntosh, "Toward A Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime"
(1991),29 Osgoode Hall L.J. 863 at pp. 892-900. For a discussion of the impact of this
dispersion on the vigour of the Canadian corporate law market, see R. Daniels, "Should
Provinces Compete?: The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law Market" (1991) 36
McGill L.J. 130; and R. Romano, "The Genius of American Corporate Law", August
10,1992, draft manuscript on file with the authors.
95 [1925] Ch. 407 (C.A.) at pp. 427-9.
96 The classic statement on this subject is attributable to Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., "Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
OfficerS" (1968),77 Yale L.J. 1078 at p. 1099: "the search for cases in which directors of
industrial corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncompli-
cated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large
haystack." See also M. Trebilcock, "The Liability of Company Directors for Negli-
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Examination of the two Canadian cases decided during the
1980s - Revelstoke Credit Union v. Miller97 and Grindrod &
District Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society Inc. 98 - that
dealt with the director's duty of care provides little indication of
any departure from traditional judicial deference to board
decision making that is not coloured by any hint of conflict of
interest. Both of these cases involved actions against directors of
credit unions alleging responsibility for the unauthorized conduct
of credit managers in making loans to third parties. In Revelstoke,
the court held that the directors did not breach their statutory duty
of care since they had no grounds for suspecting that the manager
would engage in wrongful conduct and since they had established
internal safeguard systems. In Grindrod, the court refused to
reverse a lower court finding that the directors did not actually
know of the manager's dishonesty and thus did not fail to "well
and faithfully" perform the duties ofdirectors.
In addition to the duty of care, directors are also liable for
conduct that breaches the corporate law duty of loyalty and the
statutory oppression remedy. However, review of the cases inter-
preting both standards during the 1980s reveals very little
departure from pre-existing understandings of the nature of
liability under each. For instance, by relying extensively on the
earlier judgment of the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Teck,99 the Ontario Divisional Court in the 1986 Olympia & York
Enterprises Ltd. v. Hiram Walker Resources Ltd. 1OO decision
upheld a fairly lenient standard of review for directors under the
duty of loyalty. 101 Similarly, in interpreting the scope of the
oppression remedy, the Ontario High Court in the 1987 case of
Brant Investments Ltd. and KeepRite Inc. (Re),l02 conferred
gence" (1969), Mod. L. Rev. 499. But, contra, see J. Coffee, "Litigation and Corporate
Governance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis" (1984), 52 Geo.
Wash. L.Rev. 789.
m [1984] 2 W.W.R. 297,24 B.L.R. 271 (B.C.S.C.).
98 (1985), lOC.C.L.I. 39, [1986] I.L.R. 7346 (B.C.CA).
99 TeckCorp, v. Millar (1972), 33 D.L.R. (3d) 288, [1973] 2 W.W.R. 385.
100 (1986), 37 D.L.R. (4th) 193,59 O.R. (2d) 254.
101 Following Teck, Mr. Justice Montgomery held that directors are not in breach of their
fiduciary duties to the company if they act in good faith in what they believe are
reasonable and probable grounds to be in the best interests of a new company. Never-
theless, the court allowed the directors to favour a takeover bid which would provide
considerably less to shareholders than the alternative offered by another bidder. See L.
Grafstein, "Whose Company Is It Anyway?: Recent Developments in Canadian
Takeover Law" (1988),46 V.T. Fac. L.Rev. 522.
102 (1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 15,60 O.R. (2d) 737, supplementary reasons 43 D.L.R. (4th)
141,61 O.R. (2d) 469 (H.C.J.), affd 80 D.L.R. (4th) 161,3 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.).
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considerable latitude on outside directors in reviewing the·
propriety of non-arm's-length transactions. 103 Indeed, the
approach of the court contrasts markedly with the much more
onerous standards of conduct developed for American directors in
comparable circumstances. 104
Under Canadian provincial securities laws, directors owe
various duties to investors and the corporation pursuant to the
disclosure obligation.l°5 Under s. 130 ofthe Securities Act,l06 for
instance, directors are liable for damages caused to investors by
prospectus misrepresentations. Nevertheless, directors are able to
insulate themselves from liability by ensuring adequate due
diligence. 10? Although the standard of conduct required for
directors under the due diligence defence is somewhat
amorphous, the leading authority on the degree of care required
by directors pursuant to this obligation still continues to be the
1968 American decision in Escott v. Barchris. 108 And, while the
1986 decision of the Ontario Securities Commission in Canadian
Tire,l09 which invoked a broad public interest standard as grounds
for enjoining a leveraged buyout transaction - even without any
actual contravention of the commission's statute, regulation or
103 The court held, ibid., at p. 36 D.L.R., that the approval of an amalgamation with a
subsidiary by the independent directors of a corporation was not a breach of the
oppression remedy by reason of the failure of the directors to consider the appropri-
ateness of alternative transactions to the amalgamation - all that was required was for
the directors to show some evidence of reasonable ben~fit to the company from the
transaction.
104 See, for instance, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Sup. Ct., 1983) (going
private transactions subject to review under entire fairness test comprised of fair deal
and fair price limbs); and Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
Sup. Ct., 1988) (duty on board to enhance the bidding process for shareholders in a
company whose control is up for sale).
105 For instance, s. 56(1) of the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, provides that
prospectuses filed pursuant to the Act contain "full, true and plain disclosure of all
material facts relating to the securities issued or proposed to be distributed" .
106 Ibid.
107 The due diligence defence requires directors to show that after reasonable investigation
they had reasonable grounds for believing that there was no misrepresentation in
respect of the non-expertised part of the prospectus and that they had no reasonable
grounds for believing that there was a misrepresentation in the expertised part of the
prospectus.
108 Escottv. Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., 1968). In
the absence of Canadian precedent, Canadian textbooks and reporters commonly cite
this case.
109 e. T.e. Dealer Holdings Ltd. v. ant. (Securities Commission) (1987), 35 a.c.L.R. 56,
10 o.s.c.a. 857 (O.S.C.), affd 37 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 35 a.L.R. 117 (Div. Ct.), leave to
appeal to Onto C.A. refused (1987), 35 a.L.R. p. xx.
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policies - has been criticized for its impact on business
certainty,110 the fact remains that the public interest jurisdiction is
closely associated with the cease-trading power, which does not, in
itself, trigger any civil liability for directors. 111
Could it be argued that the relatively static state of Canadian
law in the corporate and securities area was offset by an increase in
the level of innovation in underlying economic activity, which
created corresponding uncertainty respecting the application of
the established legal standard to novel transactions? There is no
question that Canada did experience an increase in types of trans-
actions (mergers and acquisitions) during the 1980s that were
likely to nurture legal innovation.l12 Indeed, the rate of mergers
and acquisitions activity in Canada during the 1980s was compa-
rable to that in the United States during the same period. ll3
However, in contrast to the United States, M & A activity in
Canada was typically done on a friendly basis, without-competitive
bidding.114 In large part, the lack of hostile M & A activity in
Canada is attributable to the highly concentrated nature of share
ownership in Canada; with concentrated blocks, acquirors can
only effect an ownership shift if the high stakes owners in the
target are co-operative.115 Given the more co-operative nature of
control transactions in Canada, therefore, it is unlikely that
increased M & A activity played much of a role in increasing the
vulnerability of directors to civil liability.
Examination, therefore, both of the legal standard of care and
of the level of activity occurring under this standard provides little
support for the claim that indigenous corporate and securities law
110 See, for instance, B. Pukier, "Taking Care of Business: An Inquiry into the Ontario
Securities Commission's Public Interest Mandate", draft article on file with the authors.
111 On the other hand, one could argue that the dramatic expansion of the public interest
test in the case sent out a signal of the OSC's more aggressive exercise of its jurisdiction,
which would, in tum, affect other parts of the commission's mandate. As well, it could
be argued that the more aggressive use of the cease-trading power augurs ill for directors
because investors might sue the board for damages suffered as a result of illiquidity.
112 See, for instance, R. J. Daniels, "Mergers and Acquisitions and the Public Interest:
Don't Shoot the Messenger", in L. Waverman, Corporate Globalization Through
Mergers and Acquisitions (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1991), chapter 7.
113 R.S. Khernani, "Recent Trends in Merger and Acquisition Activity in Canada and
Selected Countries" in L. Waverman, ibid., chapter 1, at pp. 12-16. Surprisingly,
Khemani finds that, when scaled to differences in GDP, the level of M & A activity in
Canada was higher than that in United States during the period 1979 to 1989.
114 Daniels and MacIntosh, supra, footnote 94, at pp. 884-5.
115 Ibid.
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duties contributed in any meaningful way to the Canadian D&O
insurance crisis. 116
(2) Developments in Non-Corporate Law Directorial Duties
Apart from the traditional corporate and securities law duties
owed by directors to the investors and the corporation as a whole,
a wide range of statutes not aimed principally at corporate gover-
nance have used directorial liability as a supplemental device to
assist in enforcement. The growth of the board's responsibility to
non-shareholder interests has been dramatic - by one writer's
count, there are now at least 106 federal and Ontario statutes that
impose civil liability on directors. l17 The popularity of gatekeeper
liability is based on the desirability of deterring wrongful conduct
beyond the levels that can be achieved through direct liability of
wrongdoers, and on the savings that governments can realize by
off-loading some of the on-budget costs of public enforcement of
corporate regulations onto private parties. 118
116 One factor which may have sparked fears of a generalized expansion of corporate law
duties was the Estey report on the coIlapse of the Canadian Commercial Bank and the
Northland Bank. He recommended that the Bank Act be expanded to provide that
directors of a bank owe a duty of care to the bank, its shareholders and the bank's depos-
itors; that the existing procedures for derivative and corporate actions be expanded; and
that all persons actuaIly injured through negligent or dishonest actions of a director be
able to bring a court action for compensation. See Estey, Report of the Inquiry into the
Collapse of the CCB and the Northland Bank (1986) as reported in Silber, "Directors'
and Officers' Liability Coverage: Directors' Liability and the Scope of Policy Exclusions
in Canada, Part II" (1991),9 C. J. Ins. Law 1 at p. 7. These recommendations were
incorporated into the Federal Government's Financial Institution Reform Package,
which was adopted in the Spring of 1992. While expanding the range of activities in
which each of the "four pillars" can engage, the new legislation requires that the Board
of Directors of each financial institution establish a Conduct Review Committee with
the duty of ensuring that prohibited non-arm's-length transactions between financial
subsidiaries do not occur, that guidelines to ensure that all transactions are arm's length
are in place, and to report annuaIly directly to the Office of the Superintendent of
Financial Institutions. However, given the distinctive problems faced in the regulation
of financial institutions, it is not clear that this model will be transplanted into the
general corporate context. For a discussion of the distinctive nature of financial insti-
tution regulation, see R.J. Daniels, "Form Over Substance: Bad Policy as a Recipe for
Bad Federalism in the Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions", forthcoming in
Osgoode HaIl L. J.
117 D. Palmateer, "Statutory Liabilities and Offences of Directors and Officers in
Ontario", draft memorandum dated October 9, 1990, on file with the authors.
118 Kraakman (1984) and (1986) supra, footnote 11. See also R. Howse, J.R.S. Prichard
and M.J. Trebilcock, "SmaIler or Smarter Government?" (1990), U. T. L.J. 428; R.
Howse, "Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift To Incentives and the
Future of the Regulatory State", forthcoming in Alta. L. Rev.
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Liability under general legislative schemes usually takes the
form of an explicit statutory provision detailing board legal
responsibility for failing to play an appropriate gatekeeping or
monitoring role in the corporation's activities. 119 For instance,
amendments to the Environmental Protection Act120 and the
Ontario Water Resources Act121 in 1986 obligated directors and
officers to make continuous, diligent and independent inquiries to
ascertain whether the corporation is engaging in activities which
may result in the deposit or discharge of a contaminant into the
natural environment, or the diminution of water quality. Each
director is required to take all reasonable positive steps to prevent
such pollution. Further, with the passage of the Goods and
Services Tax (GST) legislation in December of 1990, directors
became liable along with their corporations for the remittance of
the GST. Again, a "due diligence" defence exists, but only if the
director ensures that controls to prevent a default are both estab-
lished and functioning effectively. 122
The expansion of liability under these non-corporate statutes
has introduced an important source of uncertainty into board
decision making in Canada. Although most of these provisions
allow for a due diligence defence, it is often difficult to predict with
any degree of certainty the conduct necessary to satisfy the
defence. This is especially so given the omnipresent danger that a
court seized of a matter arising under these provisions will be
119 For instance, under the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, directors face civil
liability for failing to "take all reasonable care" in ensuring that their corporations do
not unlawfully discharge waste into the environment: Environmental Protection Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19, s. 194(1) (enacted S.O. 1986, c. 68, s. 17; amended S.O. 1988, c.
54, s. 50).
120 Ibid.
121 R.S.O. 1990, c. 0.40, s. 116 (enacted S.O. 1986, c. 68, s. 42; amended S.O. 1988, c. 54, s.
87).
122 "Directors are liable for GST", The Bottom Line, December, 1990, p. 35. On April 12,
1991, the Ontario government announced an extension of personal liability for unpaid
wages and vacation pay in the event of bankruptcy of a corporation to all officers of the
bankrupt corporation. The proposed legislation was withdrawn in June, 1991, but the
signal to the D&O insurers is that such liability could well be imposed in the future, and
that the government expects D&O insurance to cover the risks. "Officers on hook for
severance" , Financial Post, April 12, 1991, p. 1. Most recently, the Occupational Health
and Safety Law Amendment Act, 1990, S.O. 1990, c. 7, requires that all directors and
officers take reasonable care to ensure compliance with the OHSA and regulations. See
Peter W. Strahlendorf, Personal Liability of Directors and Officers of Corporations in
Ontario for Occupational Health and Safety, November, 1990, paper on file with
authors.
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influenced by compensation rather than deterrence objectives,
and will accordingly assess the adequacy of the defendant's
conduct with some regard to the depth of his or her pocket. For
instance, the Tax Court of Canada in Fraser v. M. N. R. 123 held that
a director of a bankrupt company was liable for employee deduc-
tions not remitted to Revenue Canada despite the fact that he was
responsible for the operation.al rather than the financial parts of
the business, and despite the fact that he had-made inquiries about
the deductions with the company's financial officer - who had
given him an assurance that the remittances would be forwarded
to the government forthwith.
Exacerbating the uncertainty respecting the ambit of the due
diligence defence are the difficulties in discerning the degree of
liability that is actually triggered by these non-corporate law
statutes. For instance, under provincial corporate and
employment standards legislation, directors are liable for wages
and other sundry benefits owed by the company to employees up
to some statutorily prescribed ceiling. l24 These provisions have
been subject to conflicting interpretation by the courts in respect
of the liability of directors for costly termination pay owed to
employees by insolvent corporations.125
The statutory expansions of directors' and officers' liability
could lead to a withdrawal of insurance supply if, in addition to
expanding the need for liability insurance, they increase the uncer-
tainty surrounding the liability standard and the application of that
standard. In fact, the appearance of an exclusion for liability for
pollution-related offences in the last few years indicates that just
such uncertainty has occurred. There is considerable uncertainty
of how the courts will apply the legislation and, with potential
liability running to millions, if not billions, of dollars, the D&O
insurers simply refuse to insure that risk.
123 (1987),87 D.T.C. 250.
124 See, for instance, s. 119 of the CBCA and s. 131 of the OBCA. Section 119 renders
directors jointly and severally liable to employees for all wages and other debts not
exceeding six months wages payable to each such employee for services performed for
the corporation while they served as directors.
125 In Schwartz v. Scott (1985), 35 A.C.W.S. (2d) 406, the Quebec Court of Appeal held
that s. 99 of the Canada Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 32, permitted employees to
recover funds from directors in respect of wrongful dismissal judgments obtained
against the corporation, while the Ontario High Court of Justice in Mills Hughes v.
Raynor (1985), 10 C.C.E.L. 180, determined that CBCA s. 119(1) did not permit
employees to recover from directors for such wrongful dismissal judgments.
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(3) Summary
When one considers the proliferation of non-corporate law
directorial duties, it may be that there was a greater expansion of
Canadian directors' and officers' liability during the "crisis" years
of the mid-1980s than there was in the United States. However,
there are simply not enough reported cases in Canada on which to
form a statistically sound evaluation, and claims data is of only
minor assistance.126 Thus, the lack of sufficient claims experience
prevented the industry from forming a conclusion as to how D&O
policies would be interpreted by Canadian courts in the early crisis
year of 1985.127 .
Therefore, while Romano argues that an "anti-insurance" bias
on the part of U.S. courts when interpreting D&O policies led to
non-diversifiable risk and uncertainty and undermined the
insurance function, the very lack of opportunity to interpret such
documents in Canadian courts meant that no independent analysis
of the risks of that or any other bias could be formed. D&O
insurers have no choice but to apply the U.S. example to Canada,
tempered of course by Canadian claims experience and such
judgments as are in fact generated by the Canadian courts. With
126 Indeed, the introduction to the 1989 Wyatt Survey of Canadian corporations contains
the following caveat: "The survey results are interesting and confirm some generally
held conclusions about D&O liability insurance in Canada. However, care should be
taken when drawing conclusions as the data may not be representative of actual circum-
stances or conditions ... we do not believe the claims experience reported to be suffi-
cient on which to base conclusions." 1989 Wyatt Canadian Survey, supra, footnote 25,
at p. 1.
127 As one participant at the Insurance Law and Practice Conference in Toronto on March
18/19, 1985, concluded: "it is apparent from our discussion of the statutory and other
liabilities of directors and officers and our review of the two most common D & 0
wordings that there has been little opportunity to date for the courts to define the risk
being underwritten, or to shed light on the various ambiguities in the policies
themselves." John I.S. Nicholl (Ogilvy, Renault) "Directors' and Officers' Insurance",
Major Developments in Insurance Law and Practice Conference, March 18/19, 1985,
Toronto, at p. 37. This situation did not change during the years ofthe D&O crisis. In a
paper delivered at the 1987 Annual Institute on Continuing Legal Education, Corporate
Council Seminar, R. Donaldson stated: "Any study of the nature and extent of the
liability of directors of Canadian corporations by necessity must focus on potential legal
liabilities rather than case studies. Fortunately, with the exception of statutory liability
for wages and tax arrears, there are few recent cases where any of the identified common
law or statutory liabilities of directors and officers have actually been asserted in a claim
against such persons." Robert A. Donaldson, "Update on the Law of Directors' and
Officers' Liability", 1987 Annual Institute on Continuing Legal Education, Liability of
Corporate Officers and Directors -Impact ofthe Insurance Crisis, February 5, 1987, p.
1.
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the trends in the United States in 1985-86 towards a stricter appli-
cation of the negligence and fiduciary standards applicable to
directors, towards increased statutory duties of directors, and
towards strict interpretations of D&O policies against the insurer,
D&O insurers operating in Canada raised the premiums here in
anticipation of a similar, albeit more "Canadian" (that is,
subdued), judicial trend.
The foregoing analysis of the nature and causes of the most
recent crisis in Canadian D&O liability insurance lays to rest any
fears that the crisis was the artificial creation of collusion or of
foreign insurers seeking to cross-subsidize their losses in foreign
markets. Rather, the evidence corresponds with Winter's theory
of competitive insurance cycles operating in a climate of restric-
tions on costless equity infusions. As Winter concludes: 128
. . . in general a crisis will be characterized by an increase in premiums that is
greater- possibly much greater - than could be "justified" by any increase
in expected claims. This increase and the consequent increase in profits is
consistent with a competitive market. The market-wide increase in profits
does not imply collusion.
The Canadian D&O liability insurance crisis can thus be seen in
the context of a crisis in liability insurance generally. After years
of surplus supply, investment income underwriting, and cheap and
abundant reinsurance, a trend towards higher tort awards and
more stringent standards of care in the United States and several
severe storms in Europe caused the global reinsurance market to
contract - seemingly overnight. The severe contraction of the
supply of reinsurance, and the inability of the Canadian capital
markets to finance independently the larger risks such as D&O
coverage, had the most severe impact on the most uncertain lines.
As Winter says, "The most uncertain lines will bear the brunt of
shocks to the capacity of the entire market, absorbing and
releasing capacity over the cycle. "129
The small and undeveloped nature of the Canadian D&O
market means that the law of large numbers is inoperative and
Canadian D&O policies cannot be underwritten as a completely
separate market. Thus, the uncertainty generated by the changing
application of directors' negligence standards in the United States
and the policy of interpreting D&O contracts against the interests
128 Winter (1988), supra, footnote 27, at p. 498.
129 Ibid.
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of the insurer had a profound impact on expected claims in
Canada and discouraged a uniquely Canadian expansion in
reinsurance supply. This impact was in addition to the direct
influence warranted by the trading and corporate links between
the two countries. The failure to see the Canadian D&O market
separately from that in the U.S. is not the result of investor or
consumer myopia but of the statistical requirements of the




It follows from Winter's analysis of competitive insurance cycles
that premium ceilings and more stringent premium/equity ratios
will likely increase, rather than decrease, the amplitude of
insurance cycles, and so do more harm than good. The premium
increases of the D&O crisis were a competitive response to the
threat of large future claims indicated by the claims experience in
the United States and to the sudden need for capital replen-
ishment which confronted the industry after years of cut-throat
competition. The Canadian regulators seem to have understood
the competitive nature of the insurance industry, and have
refrained from proposing premium caps. They were, however,
active on several other fronts.
The Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act130 and the
Foreign Insurance Companies Act l3lwere amended in July,
1987.132 The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions
took heed of the criticisms of the premium/equity ratio as the
principal measure of solvency, ignoring as it did the magnitude of
the potential liabilities flowing from those premiums. The old
capital reserve requirements were replaced, therefore, with a new
s. 171 (now s. 516 ofthe Insurance Company Act), which required
130 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-12.
131 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-13.
132 An act to amend certain Acts relating to financial institutions, R.S.C. 1985, c. 21 (3rd
Supp.), ss. 5 to 43. The amendments to these Acts, as well as the controls placed on
reinsurance activities discussed below, have been carried over in the new Insurance
Companies Act, S.C. 1991, c. 47, which received royal assent on December 13, 1991,
came into force June 1, 1992, and the text of which can be found at Can. Gaz., Part II/,
Vol. 14 No.7, February 19, 1992, p. 1465. This Act repealed and replaced the Canadian
and British Insurance Companies Act and the Foreign Insurance Companies Act.
S--22 C.B.L.J.
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that capital be maintained at the highest level indicated by any of
three different criteria: premiums, liabilities and claims equity. 133
Also, in order that the government be in a better position to antic-
ipate trouble in this volatile industry, quarterly financial state-
ments are now required of all licensed insurance companies (s.
664), and a licensed actuary must report annually on the adequacy
ofthe company's reserves (s. 667).
The more stringent capital requirements are still subject to the
criticism levelled by Winter that they are likely to add to the
amplitude of insurance cycles by reducing the amount of insurance
that can be written when prices rise. It is probably more sensible to
tie capital maintenance and reserve requirements to potential
liabilities only and to do away with the premium/equity ratio as a
guideline. As of Summer 1993, oversupply had again returned to
the property-casualty insurance market, and this ratio was not
likely to cause any distress in the market in the very near future.
However, the industry was predicting the onset of another "hard
market" by 1995, or sooner, if there is another shock to capacity
such as the liability boom in the United States or a repeat of the
reinsurance bubble. l34 The continued use of the premium/equity
ratio to gauge solvency could exacerbate the next cycle.
In 1989, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institu-
tions took steps to ensure that the kind of reinsurance bubble
which had so disrupted liability insurance markets in the mid-
1980s would not be repeated. As Robert Hammond, then Deputy
Superintendent of Financial Institutions, commented, the regula-
tions which came into effect on January 1, 1990, aimed to
implement the "lessons learned from the [insurance company]
failures in the early 1980's".135 One of these lessons was that
133 See the Asset (Property and Casualty Companies) Regulations, SOR/92-524, Can. Gaz.
Part II, Vol. 126, No. 20, p. 3650, for the detailed calculation of the capital reserve
requirement. These calculations are essentially the same as those contained in the
former s. 171, but have been moved into the Regulations for ease of amendment.
134 The Belton Report, supra, footnote 33, at p. 10: "If my 'crash and bum' scenario
unfolds ... it will be late 1995."
135 Telephone conversation, Friday, June 7, 1991. The reinsurance controls referred to
were contained in the Reinsurance (Canadian Insurance Companies) Regulations:
SOR/89-573, Can. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 123, No. 26, p. 4877; the Reinsurance (British
Insurance Companies) Regulations SOR/89-574, Can. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 126, No. 26, p.
4887; and the Reinsurance (Foreign Insurance Companies) Regulations: SOR/89-575,
Can. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 126, No. 26, p. 4894. The same limits apply to all companies
based on their Canadian policies.
The Reinsurance Regulations have been renewed under the Insurance Companies
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insurance companies, like consumers, must retain a portion of
their liabilities as an incentive to engage in sound underwriting
practices. Without retentions by retail insurance companies to
guard against their own moral hazard, they sometimes write poor-
quality business. This moral hazard culminated in undue risks
being passed off on reinsurance companies who, removed from
the scene, were not in a position to assess the risk adequately for
themselves. To guard against this, retail insurers are now required
to retain at least 25% of any risk that they insure.
Another lesson learned was that unlicensed (and sometimes
largely unregulated) offshore reinsurers cannot always be trusted
to pay claims that exceed their assets invested in Canada. The
previous rules had stipulated that the premium ceded by a
Canadian insurer to the offshore reinsurer had to be held in trust
by the Canadian insurer as a deposit against claims. To try to
ensure that the claims could be paid, these premiums could not be
credited as a reduction in the Canadian insurer's liabilities. But the
whole point of insurance is that claims may sometimes exceed the
premium, and this rule was not found to be stringent enough to
guard against "rogue" unlicensed reinsurers defaulting on their
policies. The Canadian liability market is so small, however, and
risks such as D&O policies are so large that the offshore market
cannot be cut off completely. Since 1990, therefore, no more than
25% of a risk can be ceded to unlicensed reinsurers. Further, the
Canadian insurer cannot allow reinsurance to reduce its capital
requirements below 50% of what they would be without the
reinsurance. l36 Since the Canadian insurer still has the primary
responsibility to the policyholder, this will ensure that the insurer
has reserves sufficient to cover the claim in case the reinsurer
reneges, and that a maximum of 25% of a risk can be held by
unlicensed reinsurers.
With respect to the Canadian D&O market in particular, there
has been some easing of the supply since the crisis, but not, as
outlined above, as much as in some other lines. This is not
Act by the Reinsurance (Canadian Companies) Regulations SOR/92-298, Can. Gaz.
Part II, Vol. 126, No. 12, p. 2183; and the Reinsurance (Foreign Companies) Regula-
tions SOR/92-302, Can. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 126, No. 12, p. 2198.
136 The "reinsurance ratio" mechanism of the former s. 172 of the old Canadian and British
Insurance Companies Act enforced this limit. The same mechanism is now contained in
the Assets (Property and Casualty Companies) Regulations, supra, footnote 133, s.
3(1).
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surprising, given the continued uncertainty surrounding the move
to increasing statutory duties for directors and officers on both
sides of the border, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the
eventual aftermath of the savings and loan debacle in the United
States, and similar recession-driven failures in Canada.
The reinsurance regulations should help to ensure that the
Canadian liability insurance industry is not as vulnerable to global
reinsurance cycles as before, and improved monitoring systems by
the government regulators should help to improve performance
generally. "Made in Canada" D&O policies, exclusions, limits
and premiums, however, will simply have to await the day when
there is sufficient Canadian claims experience for underwriters to
assess Canadian risks separately.
2. Corporate Governance
Although the policy recommendations developed above may
temper wild oscillations in the level of insurance capacity, the
status of the Canadian D&O market as a highly specialized,
residual liability market will make it difficult to eradicate
completely any vestiges of cyclicality in insurance availability.
This cyclicality has profound implications for the quality of
Canadian corporate governance. As directors become increas-
ingly aware of the risks that are posed to their personal wealth
from burgeoning legal liability, their concern with the availability
of durable and cost-effective D&O insurance coverage can be
expected to increase correspondingly. In this respect, any
suggestion that directors will not be able to secure insurance
coverage for the expected duration of their service will impact
adversely on their decision to serve - making it difficult for
Canadian corporations to create boards composed of dynamic,
successful business leaders. 137
But perhaps the greater challenge posed by cyclical insurance
availability to the integrity of the Canadian corporate governance
model is that prospective board members will agree to serve, but
137 The Board of Directors Fifth Annual Study in Canada (1991) (KomlFerry Interna-
tional) reported, at p. 8, that 67% of sUlVeyed CEOs believe that there is a problem
attracting and retaining qualified new directors. The fear of liability for unpaid wages
upon insolvency as illustrated by the resignations of directors from troubled Westar
Mining Ltd. and Canadian Air Lines International Ltd. is an example of this
phenomenon. See R. Daniels and E. Morgan, "Directors face grab-bag of liabilities",
Financial Post, August 12, 1992, p. 10.
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then insist as a condition of appointment that the companies on
whose boards they serve credibly commit to running the corpo-
ration in a way that minimizes the prospect of any future legal
entanglements by, for instance, reducing the riskiness of the
corporation's investment set. In other words, board members
would guard against future liability through excessive risk
reduction. Doing so, however, may well require violation of the
positive net present value rulel38 - the core decision rule for
corporate investment activity which states that all projects whose
expected benefits exceed their risk adjusted costs be adopted-
which would, in turn, imperil the wealth creation function of the
corporation.
An alternative but equally objectionable option would be for
individuals to accept nominations to corporate boards, but then
insist that the boards systematically contract out the risks of board
decision making to outside professional advisers. Essentially, by
retaining experts to advise the board on discrete matters, the
board can claim reliance on this outside advice, and thus transfer
some, if not all, of the responsibility of negligent or illegal action
to these advisers. Although this delegation alternative has
received some modest encouragement from both judicial and
regulatory sources,139 its normative desirability is not uncon-
troversial. Quite simply, by effecting risk control through risk-
shifting strategies, there is a danger that professional advice -
which should do no more than provide a foundation upon which
directors can make fully informed, rational decisions - will
determine rather than merely inform board decisions. The
escalation of the professional adviser's role follows quite naturally
from the depreciated sense of responsibility of board members
once professional advisers are integrated into the decision-making
process. And while this role may be applauded in the context of
conflict of interest transactions, it is less suitable for the kinds of
decisions that must be made in the day-to-day management and
oversight of the business and affairs of the corporation. This is
especially so given the infirmities of the partnership form (the
predominant organizational form for professional advisers in
Canada) in relation to risk bearing. 140
138 See, generally, S. Ross and R. Westerfield, Corporate Finance, (St. Louis, Times
Mirror/Mosby College Publishing, 1988), chapter 3.
139 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra, footnote 88, and OSC Policy 9.1, supra, footnote 4.
140 For a discussion of the defects of the partnership form in permitting law firms to achieve
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In light of the adverse effects of intermittent insurance avail-
ability on the quality of corporate governance, Canadian legisla-
tures will be forced to consider more closely their addiction to
directorial liability as a gatekeeping device. One suggestion in this
direction would be to mimic the lead of Delaware and other
American states by permitting shareholders to contract out of
liability for the corporate law duty of care. 141 Nevertheless, given
the relatively few times that courts in Canada, as elsewhere, have
invoked the duty of care as a basis for directorial liability, the
actual impact of such a measure on corporate governance would
be small indeed. A far more effective legislative strategy would be
to initiate an immediate and comprehensive review of the plethora
of non-corporate law legislation that imposes liability on directors
to determine whether in a setting of periodic insurance scarcity the
benefits of liability (in terms of deterrence of corporate wrong-
doing) exceed the costs occasioned (in terms of lower quality
boards and much more conservative business decision making). If
the government fails to undertake this task, it risks throwing out
the board with the legislative bathwater.
certain scale economies, see R. Daniels, "Growing Pains: the Why and How of Law
Firm Expansion" (1993), 43 V.T.L.J. 147.
141 See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, ss. 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). For a discussion of
director exculpation statutes, see J. Hanks, Jr., "Evaluating Recent State Legislation on
Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification" (1988), 43 Business
Lawyer 1207; J. Weiss, "The Effect of Director Liability Statutes on Corporate Law and
Policy" [Spring 1989] J. Corporation L. 637; and "Note", "Evaluating the New Director
Exculpation Statutes" (1988), 73 Cor. L.Rev. 786.
